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EMPOWERING THE CONSUMER: A DISCUSSION ON MINNESOTA’S DUAL
AGENCY STATUTE AND A PROPOSED SOLUTION THAT PUTS THE CONSUMER
FIRST
I.

INTRODUCTION

Many Americans across this county strive to achieve the dream of home
ownership. The obstacles1 that stand in the way of achieving that dream can be staggering and
unique to the persons pursuing home ownership. To a certain extent, it is expected that there be
some proverbial hoops of fire to jump through before finally turning that key to a new home.
What the consumer does not expect is to find a statutory scheme that creates unnecessary
obstacles, such as a broker with a divided loyalty and information barriers, at the expense of the
public.2 This statutory scheme is enshrined in Minnesota Statutes, section 82. The statute
provides for standardized disclosure and notices regarding the agency relationship between the
broker/salesperson and the consumer—in all there are three required notices.3 Nor does the
consumer expect the state to favor a brokerage’s bottom line over a consumer’s right to fully

1

The obstacles can include such barriers as: 1) securing adequate financing; 2) finding the right
location and type of structure to meet a buyer’s needs; 3) zoning regulations that might prevent
intended uses or the building itself might not be up to code; 4) the surrounding area might be
susceptible to circumstances that reduce property values; or 5) title marketability concerns and
insurance coverage.
2
As will be discussed, the main obstacle is that the limited disclosures foster an environment that
encourages a less informed consumer. See infra Part IV & V.
3
The first agency disclosure is required at “the first substantive contact.” The second disclosure
comes “when the consumer engages either a seller’s agent or buyer’s agent” through either a
listing or buyer’s agreement. The third comes in the purchase agreement itself. Mary Szto, Dual
Real Estate Agents and the Double Duty of Loyalty, 41 REAL EST. L.J. 22, 70 (2012).
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understand all the relevant aspects of the transaction. Yet in Minnesota, that is precisely what
happens.
All too often, a typical residential real estate transaction involves a broker with a
divided loyalty—to buyer, to seller, and to self.4 The average consumer likely understands that
an agent, or a party acting on behalf of a seller or buyer, owes a significant duty of loyalty to the
represented consumer.5 Thus, when a broker represents both the buyer and the seller in a realty
transaction, the consumer will likely sense that something is amiss. The interests of a seller and a
buyer are fundamentally at odds. The seller will want to sell the property at the highest price
possible, disclaim every warranty and representation permitted by law, adhere only to the
minimum disclosure requirements, keep confidential information confidential, and have an
aggressive representative to negotiate with the other side. The buyer on the other hand will want
the price lowered as much as possible, obtain as many warranties and representations as possible
above the statutory disclosure requirements, maintain confidential information secret, and secure
aggressive representation to advance the buyer’s other interests in negotiations.6 The consumer
may be surprised, however, to find that a real estate agent is permitted to represent both sides to
the transaction.7 What is not surprising is that such representation is the source of many

4

See infra Part III.B.
An “agent” is defined as “one who is authorized to act for or in place of another.” BLACK’S
LAW DICTIONARY 72 (9th ed. 2009).
6
GEORGE LEFCOE, REAL ESTATE TRANSACTIONS, FINANCE, AND DEVELOPMENT 22–23 (6th ed.
2009) (describing the negotiation process and diverging interests of a buyer and seller in realty).
7
MINN. STAT. § 82.55, subdiv. 6 (2012).
5
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disputes.8 Despite the fact that this dual relationship is rife with troubles, the consumer will often
find him or herself subject to it.9 This form of agency is called dual agency.10
Minnesota courts recognize the conflict of interest as an inherent one,11 yet they
consider it an acceptable conflict so long as the parties can agree to it.12 Even though the required
disclosure has been increasingly limited.13 But the question remains, to what extent the parties
actually understand the implications of this conflict? It seems absurd that an informed consumer
would consent to this kind of conflict in what is likely to be the largest and most significant type
of transaction in which he or she will engage in.
This article proposes a new approach to how Minnesota should view the agency
relationship between a real estate broker/salesperson with consumers. This article focuses
exclusively on the residential real estate-dual representation form of agency. In Part II, the article
provides useful definitions of agency concepts and outlines current Minnesota law.14 In Part III,
the origins of agency law is discussed and Minnesota’s common law history of agency is
evaluated, along with the pattern of limiting consumer disclosures.15 Part IV discusses the
legislative purpose of section 82 and how that purpose is evaded through the statutory text
itself.16 Part V evaluates how other jurisdictions view the topic of dual and designated agency
and how some of those jurisdictions strive to serve their legislative purposes, similar to those in

See Stzo, supra note 3, at 22 (noting that “the top three issues that cause the most disputes in a
real estate transaction are dual agency, disclosure, and breach of fiduciary duty.”).
9
See infra Part III.C.
10
See infra Parts II, III & IV (discussing and defining dual agency); infra note 26.
11
See infra note 42 (and accompanying text).
12
See MINN. STAT. § 82.67, subdiv. 3(IV) (2012) (requiring “informed consent of all parties”).
13
See infra Part III.C (discussing the trend limiting disclosures to the consumer).
14
Infra Part II.
15
Infra Part III.
16
Infra Part IV.
8
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Minnesota.17 Next, in Part VI, the article discusses how Minnesota and other states view the
concept of the attorney-broker acting in a dual agency capacity.18 Finally, in Part VII, the article
proposes various statutory amendments that will help align the text of the law with the purpose
of the law,19 followed by a brief summation in Part VIII.20
II.
A.

USEFUL DEFINITIONS ON THE LAW OF AGENCY

Agency, Dual Agency, and Designated Agency
In 1981, Minnesota courts settled on a general definition of the word “agency.”

Minnesota defines it as “the fiduciary relation[ship] which results from the manifestation of
consent by one person to another that the other shall act on his behalf and subject to his control,
and consent by the other so to act.”21 This definition is the launching point to understand the
relationship between a seller or purchaser of residential realty with an agent. The basic elements
of an agency relationship, as outlined in the Second Restatement of Agency, are: 1) a mutual
manifestation of consent; 2) a principal and an agent; and 3) the principal’s continuous control
over that agent.22 Minnesota courts have consistently used this restatement definition of agency
in the real estate context.23 There is an additional requirement that any agency relationship

17

Infra Part V.
Infra Part VI.
19
Infra Part VII.
20
Infra Part VIII.
21
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 1 (1) as adopted in A. Gay Jenson Farms Co. v. Cargill,
Inc., 309 N.W.2d 285, 290 (Minn. 1981).
22
Id.
23
See Cargill, 309 N.W2d at 290 (the most authoritative case); New Millennium Consulting, Inc.
v. United HealthCare Servs., 695 F.3d 854 (8th Cir. 2012) (applying Minnesota law); Medlock v.
Meahyen, No. A11-320, 2012 WL 118240, *15 (Minn. Ct. App. Jan. 17, 2012); Tonna Mech.,
Inc. v. Double AI, LLC, No. A10-1174, 2011 WL 2437387, *2 (Minn. Ct. App. June 20, 2011).
18
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related to real property be in writing.24 This is an exception from the common law rule that,
while a contract can govern an agency relationship, no contract is necessary to enter into an
agency relationship.25
A dual agency is a standard agency relationship, except that one agent acts on
behalf of both principals in the same transaction.26 A designated agent is typically defined by a
state legislature and can vary from state to state. Generally, it is a standard agency relationship in
which a brokerage firm, as the agent, will designate at least one salesperson to exclusively
represent the buyer and at least one salesperson to exclusively represent the seller.27 It is the dual
agency relationship, and to a lesser extent designated agency, that creates controversy.28
Minnesota regulates the controversial dual agent relationship through statute.29
B.

Current Minnesota Dual Agency Definition
In Minnesota, dual agency is defined by statute for purposes of a real estate

agent’s relationship with a purchaser and seller. Minnesota expands the dual agency definition
providing that dual agency also arises when the agent-broker delegates its duties to salespersons
representing one or the other consumers.30 The statute states that a dual agency “means a

24

All real estate transactions should be in writing to overcome the statute of frauds defense. See
LEFCOE, supra note 6, at 63–64 & 66–69. In Minnesota, the Legislature mandates that the agency
relationship that brings about the sale must be in writing. MINN. STAT. § 82.66, subdiv. 1(a)
(2012). This is consistent with the “equal dignities” rule in the common law of agency.
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 3.02 cmt. b (2006).
25
PMH Props. v. Nichols, 263 N.W.2d 799, 803 (Minn. 1978).
26
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 392 (1958); see also BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 73
(9th ed. 2009) (defining dual agent as one who represents both parties in the same transaction).
27
See infra notes 181–82 (those states which have a designated agency).
28
See Szto, supra note 3, at 22 (noting that dual agency (and related topics) creates disputes).
29
See generally MINN. STAT. § 82 (2012) (regulating the real estate broker/salesperson
relationship with consumers).
30
See id. § 82.55, subdiv. 6.; see also supra Part II.A.
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situation in which a licensee owes a duty to more than one party to the transaction.”31 The statute
goes on to list two circumstances in which a dual agency arises including: “1) when one licensee
represents both the buyer and the seller in a real estate transaction; or 2) when two or more
licensees, licensed to the same broker, each represent a party to the transaction.”32 Minnesota is
not alone in defining dual agency by statute. Many state statutes provide for the relationship and
its parameters.33 Interestingly, the concept has deep historical roots.
III.

THE INCEPTION OF AGENCY LAW AND MINNESOTA’S HISTORICAL TAKE ON DUAL AGENCY

A.

The Law of “Use”
The roots of dual agency may stretch back to the beginnings of agency law—or

“use” law—in old English law.34 Sir Frederick Pollock,35 when speaking of the term “agency” in
1899, observed that “the phrase will appear in our own day as expressing rights and duties which
the common law can sanction without the help of any ‘equity’”36 In the context of a land
conveyance during Twelfth-century England, Sir Pollock noted that “we sometimes see the lord
intervening between the vendor and the purchaser of land.”37 In explaining this transfer of land
Sir Pollock reported that: “[T]he vendor surrenders the land to the lord ‘to the use’ of the

31

§ 82.55, subdiv. 6.
Id. § 82.55, subdiv. 6(1)–(2).
33
See infra notes 180 & 182 (identifying states that provide for dual agency).
34
FREDERICK POLLOCK & FREDERIC WILLIAM MAITLAND, THE HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW:
BEFORE THE TIME OF EDWARD I 228–29 (2d ed. Boston, Little, Brown & Co. 1899).
35
Sir Frederick Pollock was an English legal scholar and baronet. He was a professor at the
University of Oxford (1883–1903) and was made a king’s counsel in 1920. Sir Frederick
Pollock, 3rd Baronet, ENCYCLOPÆDIA BRITANNICA,
http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/468047/Sir-Frederick-Pollock-3rd-Baronet (last
visited Oct. 8, 2013).
36
POLLOCK & MAITLAND, supra note 34, at 230.
37
Id.
32
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purchaser by a rod, and the lord by the same rod delivers the land to the purchaser.”38 In our
modern day understanding of agency law in Minnesota, this hardly constitutes the elements of an
agency relationship.39 However, one can see its inception as the lord having a duty to take
possession of the property on behalf of the vendor along with a subsequent duty to the purchaser
to transfer the property to him upon payment to the vendor. In any event, it at least resembles a
dual agency in that both the buyer and the seller are using the same person to further their
interests—the conveyance of realty.40 From a more modern standpoint the transaction seems
absurd, yet understandable in the context of a Middle Age society in Europe.41
B.

Minnesota’s Dual Agency: A Common Law Approach
As early as 1887, the Minnesota Supreme Court observed the inherent problems

with a dual agency relationship in a real estate transaction. The court in Webb v. Paxton noted
that:
[I]f an agent, under [dual agency], may enter the service of a proposed purchaser,
and charge him a commission for his services, it immediately becomes [the
agent’s] interest to sell only to those who will pay [the agent] double commission,
to the exclusion of all others. The interests of his principal are manifestly in
danger of prejudice from the counter-interest in the agent.42

38

Id.
See supra Part II.A.
40
Leaving aside the idea that either party to the transaction ever had any real control over his
lord. It may be that the vendor and the lord have the agency relationship and the vendee is
merely the beneficiary.
41
Distinction in old England: the “use” law provided for a conveyance to the lord so the lord
owned the land for a moment before conveying it to the purchaser. See POLLOCK & MAITLAND,
supra note 34, at 230–31. That is more like a straw man in today’s jargon. BLACK’S LAW
DICTIONARY 1557 (9th ed. 2009) (“A third party used in some transactions as a temporary
transferee to allow the principal parties to accomplish something that is otherwise
impermissible.”).
42
Webb v. Paxton, 36 Minn. 532, 534, 32 N.W. 749, 750 (1887) (finding that a dual agency did
not exist because the agent exclusively represented the seller in the transaction). The Webb
39
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Interestingly enough, the Webb court does not find that such an agency is inherently unlawful. It
observes—as do later courts—that an agent engaging in a double agency, while “repugnant to
the fundamental principle on which the law of agency rests,” may be permissible so long as the
agent does not do so in secret.43 The court also affirmed that a broker is more than a mere gobetween, even when not entrusted with knowledge of terms or price of the sale.44
Almost four decades later, the Minnesota Supreme Court adopted the rule that
when an agent acts as a dual agent and one of the principals is ignorant of the dual agency, the
ignorant principal has an absolute right to rescind the transaction whether the principal has
suffered an injury or not.45 In Olson v. Pettibone, the court observed that nothing will defeat the
ignorant principal’s remedy “except his own confirmation after full knowledge of all the facts.”46
After the Olson decision, it became clearer that a real estate agent could not hide the dual agency
from the principal and expect to retain a commission. Under current agency law, this amounts to
a breach of a fiduciary duty of loyalty to the principal.47

court’s observation regarding the inherent conflict of interest may be mere dicta in this case, yet
considering following case law, it will prove to be good dicta.
43
Id. at 533 (noting that where such an agency exists the broker may not recover a commission,
“at least against a party kept in ignorance of the [dual agency]”).
44
Id. at 533–34 (noting that by the broker’s acceptance of employment as seller’s agent, he
acquired a duty to sell the property as quickly as possible and at the best price).
45
Olson v. Pettibone, 168 Minn. 414, 417, 210 N.W. 149, 149 (1926) (in the fraudulent real
estate transaction context).
46
Id. at 418 (citing Ferguson v. Gooch, 26 S.E. 397 (Va. 1896)).
47
A fiduciary duty is “[a] duty of utmost good faith, trust, confidence, and candor owed by a
fiduciary . . . to the beneficiary . . . ; a duty to act with the highest degree of honesty and loyalty
toward another person and in the best interests of the other person . . . .” BLACK’S LAW
DICTIONARY 581 (9th ed. 2009). The Minnesota Supreme Court held that where a fiduciary failed
to disclose the dual representation, the fiduciary had breached the duty of loyalty. Anderson v.
Anderson, 293 Minn. 209, 208, 197 N.W.2d 720, 725–26 (1972).

8

In White v. Boucher, fifty-six years later, the court evaluated what it takes for a
real estate broker to enter an agency relationship with a principal and the fiduciary duties that
arise from that relationship.48 The White court observed that a broker enters an agency
relationship “upon the execution of a listing agreement” with the principal.49 As an agent, the
broker assumes the “duty to communicate to the [principal] ‘all facts of which he has knowledge
which might affect the principal’s rights or interests.’”50 In discussing the agent’s failure to
disclose the purchaser’s financial troubles to the seller, the White court noted that “[w]hat might
be ‘the best thing’ for the seller must ultimately be the seller’s decision, not the agent’s.”51 The
notion that the principal must decide what is best for his or herself is well enshrined in the
common law concept of the right and the power of control the principal has over the agent. A
principal may have his right to control the agent limited only by contract, yet the principal’s

48

White v. Boucher, 322 N.W.2d 560 (Minn. 1982).
Id. at 564 (citing Klawitter v. Billick, 308 Minn. 325, 242 N.W.2d 588 (1976)); cf. MINN.
STAT. § 82.66 (2012) (requiring a signed listing agreement or buyer’s agreement before the
agency begins, no matter the agency’s form).
50
White, 322 N.W.2d at 564 (citing Magee v. Odden, 220 Minn. 498, 503, 20 N.W.2d 87, 90
(1945)). In fact, a broker has a duty to make a “full disclosure of the financial status of a
prospective purchaser.” Id. at 564–65 (citing Fulsom v. Egner, 248 Minn. 156, 79 N.W.2d 25
(1956)). The Minnesota Supreme Court even went so far as to prevent a broker from receiving
his commission when he failed to disclose to his principal that the prospective buyer was ill and
might not be able to perform, even after the principal released the prospective buyer from the
contract due to the illness. See Hare v. Bauer, 223 Minn. 285, 26 N.W.2d 359 (1947).
51
322 N.W.2d 560 at 555–56.
49

9

power to do so is not lost.52 The court also considered who pays the agent in making agency
determinations.53
Normally the agent will be the agent of the principal who pays him,54 except
when a buyer first approaches the broker to act on the buyer’s behalf with the understanding that
the broker eventually will be paid by the seller.55 In the White case, the court’s decision as to
whether or not the agent acted as a dual agent of both the seller and the buyer turned on whether
or not the buyer exercised any control over the agent56—control being one of the basic elements
of the agency relationship.57 The court answered the agency formation question by evaluating the
subsequent control the purchaser may have exercised over the agent. Having found that the buyer
did not exercise any subsequent control, the court concluded, retroactively, that there was no
agency relationship between the real estate agent and the buyer.58
C.

Minnesota’s Dual Agency: A Statutory Approach

52

See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 118 cmt. b (1958), as adopted in Klawitter v.
Billick, 308 Minn. 325, 329–30 242 N.W.2d 588, 592 (1976). The exercise of that power, where
there is no contractual right, will generally lead to principal liability to the agent. Id. § 18 cmt. c,
as adopted in Klawitter, 308 Minn. at 330, 242 N.W.2d at 592. In any case, the court views the
authority as clearly distinguishing the difference between a principal’s right and power to impact
the agency. Klawitter, 308 Minn. at 329, 242 N.W.2d at 592 (citing to RESTATEMENT (SECOND)
OF AGENCY §§ 450, 455 & 118 (1958).
53
White, 322 N.W.2d 560 at 566.
54
Id.
55
Id. (citing Duffy v. Setchell, 347 N.E.2d 218 (Ill. App. Ct. 1976)).
56
See id. at 567 (stating that “[t]here is no evidence to suggest that [the brokerage] agents acted
at the [purchaser’s] direction or were subject to their control.”).
57
See supra note 21 (the elements of common law agency).
58
See White, 322 N.W.2d 560 at 567.
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In 1993, the Minnesota Legislature drafted statutes to govern the dual agency
relationship found in real estate transactions.59 Lawmakers, at that time, included an agency
disclosure requirement that obligated a broker or salesperson to “include a clear and complete
explanation of how the broker will represent the interests of the seller or buyer.” In the case of a
dual agency, the agent was also required to inform the principal “how that representation would
be altered in a dual agency situation . . . .”60 This is in stark contrast to today’s current law.61
The 1993 Legislature made clear that it did not intend to replace the common law
disclosure requirement for agency. Instead, it sought only “to establish a minimum standard for
regulatory purposes, [which was] not intended to abrogate common law.”62 Just as the “clear and
complete explanation” requirement has been removed from today’s current statute, so too has the
original intention of the Legislature to not abrogate the common law regarding disclosures.63 In
fact, the Legislature currently takes the opposite view and deems “disclosures made in
accordance with [the statutory requirement] . . . sufficient to satisfy common law disclosure
requirements.”64 At first glance this 180 degree turn may seem rather inconsequential, but it has

59

Act of May 20, 1993, ch. 309, § 2, subdiv. 11, 1993 Minn. Laws 1794, 1796 (codified as
amended at MINN. STAT. § 82.55, subdiv. 6 (2012)).
60
Id. § 9, subdiv. 1 at 1800 (codified as amended at MINN. STAT. § 82.67, subdiv. 1 (2012)). The
1993 disclosure also required a broker to make agency disclosures in a “time and manner
sufficient to protect the customer’s bargaining position.” Id.
61
The current law in Minnesota no longer requires a real estate agent to provide a “clear and
complete explanation” of how the interests of the principal will be served by the broker. See
generally MINN. STAT. § 82.67, subdivs. 1 & 3. (2012) (requiring only a disclosure of the types
of agency available and at most the role of the agent or broker in the various types of agency).
62
Act of May 20, 1993, ch. 309, § 9, subdiv. 3, 1993 Minn. Laws 1794, 1801 (codified as
amended at MINN. STAT. § 82.67, subdiv. 2 (2012)).
63
See generally MINN. STAT. § 82 (2012) (abandoning the former requirement and stance on the
abrogation of the common law regarding disclosure).
64
Id. § 82.67, subdiv. 2.
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a substantial impact on the sufficiency of the statutory disclosures. Especially when considering
what was once required to be disclosed, and what is now left unsaid.65 It also impacts, to a great
extent, the purpose of the statute, in that the language itself proves repugnant to the consumer’s
well-being.66
The common law disclosure requirement goes to one element of the agency
relationship’s formation—namely, consent. But not just mere consent, the consent must be
mutual, and particularly relevant to this discussion, informed.67 In one fell swoop, the Legislature
replaced the common law consent requirement with a statutory requirement, but neglected to
indicate anything in regards to the common law requirement of control. In fact, the particular
statute, section 82.67, which disclaims the common law consent rule, says absolutely nothing in
regards to control.68 Thus, it is logical to conclude that the Legislature intended to permit the
common law rule regarding control to persist unaltered.69

65

See generally supra Part III.C. The current statute confirms the limited disclosure by
disclaiming any longstanding disclosure requirement at common law, namely that the principalto-be obtain a “full knowledge of all the facts” before consent. Compare MINN. STAT. § 82.67,
subdiv. 2 (2012) (abrogating the common law disclosure requirement), with Olson v. Pettibone,
168 Minn. 414, 418, 210 N.W.2d 149, 149 (1926) (providing that principals need to have full
knowledge of all the facts).
66
See infra Part IV.
67
§ 82.67, subdiv. 3(IV) (2012) (requiring “informed consent” for dual agency). See supra note
21; see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 381 (1958) (regarding the agent’s duty to
inform the principal).
68
§ 82.67, subdiv. 2 (2012).
69
See MINN. STAT. § 645.17(2) (2012) (establishing the presumption that the entire statute is to
be effective and certain); id. § 645.19. The Minnesota Supreme Court has adopted the general
rule that the “[e]xpressio unius est exclusio alterius [doctrine] generally reflects an inference that
any omissions in a statute are intentional.” State v. Caldwell, 803 N.W.2d 373, 383 (Minn.
2011). Simply put, the legislature presumably does not make mistakes in word choice. See also
Weston v. McWilliams & Assocs., 716 N.W.2d 634, 639 (Minn. 2006) (noting that where the

12

It appears strange that the Legislature flip-flopped so quickly regarding the broad
common law disclosure requirement in favor of its current limited form,70 especially since
residential real estate transactions are singled out as protected transactions.71 It therefore seems
counter intuitive to say on the one hand, the state provides additional and heightened protections
and disclosures for residential realty on a public policy basis, and on the other hand encourages
minimal disclosures regarding the agency relationships that bring about those transactions.
However, there is more to the trend of restricting disclosures in Minnesota.
Prior to the 2001 session, the disclosure statute required that “[d]ual agents must
disclose to [b]uyers any material facts of which the broker is aware that could adversely and
significantly affect the [b]uyer’s use or enjoyment of the property.”72 During the 2001 session,
the Legislature again narrowed the scope of what must be disclosed by removing the word “any”
from “any material facts.”73 It also defined the term “material facts,” arguably narrowing what

legislature includes language in one provision and excludes it in another, such exclusion is
indicative of legislative intent).
70
See Act of Apr. 18, 1994, ch. 461, § 1, subdiv. 3 1994 Minn. Laws 309, 309 (codified as
amended at MINN. STAT. § 82.67, subdiv. 2 (2012)) (favoring a statutory disclosure requirement
instead of a minimum standard for regulatory purposes). The amendment is likely a response to a
Minnesota District Court case finding a statutory disclosure requirement insufficient in 1993. See
infra note 82.
71
See Kratzer v. Welsh Cos., LLC, 771 N.W.2d 14, 20 (2009) (noting that “[t]he legislature has
thus provided for specific, heightened duties of disclosure in the residential real estate context,”
as opposed to the commercial realty context); MINN. STAT. § 513.55, subdiv. 1 (2012) (requiring
certain disclosures in the residential realty context).
72
Act effective Oct. 1, 1996, ch. 439, art 3, § 8, subdiv. 4 1996 Minn. Laws 1108, 1141 (codified
as amended at MINN. STAT. § 82.67, subdiv. 3 (2012)).
73
Act of May 29, 2001, ch. 208, § 12, subdiv. 4 2001 Minn. Laws 856, 863 (codified as
amended at MINN. STAT. §82.67, subdiv. 3 (2012)).
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that term means, to facts that the broker actually knows that “could adversely and significantly
affect an ordinary purchaser’s use and enjoyment . . . or any intended use . . . .”74
Certainly a valid argument can be made that a broker needs to know exactly what
a material fact is so that he or she can disclose those facts. However, if that were the case, the
statute could have provided some guidance as to the meaning of “significantly affects . . . use or
enjoyment of the property,” what an “ordinary purchaser” is, and it could have nailed down what
an “intended use” means.75 Instead, the statute qualifies vague terms on the actual knowledge of
the broker and states what is not a material fact.76 In fact, the clearest rule as to what a material
fact is, pursuant to the 2001’s version, is found in sub-section (e), which states that a
contradiction of “any information in a written report” needs to be disclosed as a material fact.
Furthermore, the current statute again limits common law disclosure requirements particular to
the material facts disclosures.77 The limitation on a seller’s disclosure of material facts occurred
in 2004,78 along with some other disclosure limitations. One removed disclosure required a
broker representing a buyer to “make known to the seller . . . the fact of the agency relationship

74

Id. § 13, subdiv. 6(a) at 865 (codified as amended at MINN. STAT. § 82.68, subdiv. 3 (2012)).
(limiting the material facts disclosure to “facts of which the licensee is aware”).
75
See id. § 13, subdiv. 6(a) at 865 (mentioning terms, yet leaving them undefined). See also
MINN. STAT. § 82.68, subdiv. 3 (2012) (using the same undefined and vague language).
76
Id. § 13, subdiv. 6(b)–(d) at 865 (noting what is not a material fact). See also MINN. STAT. §
82.68, subdiv. 3(b)–(e) (2012) (adding to the list of facts that are not material facts for disclosure
purposes; including, airport zoning, information on a written report from a qualified third party,
presence of adult family homes, community-based residential facility, and nursing home).
77
MINN. STAT. § 82.68, subdiv. 3(g) (limiting disclosures in the case of registered offenders,
certain information about prior owners, accidental deaths on the property, paranormal activity,
and other information listed in subsections (b) and (c)).
78
Act effective Aug. 1, 2004, ch. 203, art. 1, § 6, subdiv. 4 2004 Minn. Laws 476, 480 (codified
as amended at MINN. STAT. § 513.56, subdiv. 4 (2012)).
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before any showing or negotiations are initiated.”79 Finally, the latest disclosure restriction
makes airport zoning immaterial, as long as the broker gives written notice of where to find the
information.80 Given the successive line of limitations on disclosures, it is not surprising that a
number of courts prior to 1993 found that when a dual agency existed, the disclosures were
inadequate and post 1993 more courts have upheld the validity of a transaction involving dual
agency.81
In 1993, just before the Legislature passed the first wave of disclosure limitations,
the U.S. District Court in Minnesota found that Edina Realty’s agency disclosure was
insufficient, even though it satisfied the statutory drafting requirement.82 As a result of Edina
Realty’s failure to disclose fully the implications of the dual agency, the Dismuke court held that

79

Act of May 5, 2004, ch. 203, art. 2, § 15, subdiv. 5(b) 2004 Minn. Laws 476, 491 (struck out
portion) (codified as amended at MINN. STAT. § 82.81, subdiv. 6(b) (2012)). Perhaps the
Legislature found it unnecessary to require this disclosure since it passed Minnesota Statute,
section 82.19, subdivision 12 in 2002 regarding fraudulent practices, which has subsequently
been renumbered as Minnesota Statute, section 82.81, subdivision 12. However, the fraudulent
practices section does not require any disclosure as to the agency to the other party in the
transaction, such a disclosure could help to guard against fraud since a party would certainly not
deal with an agent who could not show that he represents the other party. The only justification,
therefore, would be to provide for instances of an undisclosed principal. Currently, the broker or
salesperson is required not to advertise the property to the “general public” until a listing
agreement is signed—but does not prohibit approaching a particular buyer before an agreement
is signed, nor does it require a showing to the other party that the agent is duly authorized to so
act, as the law once did. See MINN. STAT. § 82.66, subdiv. 1(a) (2012); but see id. § 82.66,
subdiv. 2(a) (stating that a licensee may not perform “any” action on behalf of a buyer until an
agreement is signed).
80
Act of May 10, 2007, ch. 64, § 1, subdiv. 8 2007 Minn. Laws 507, 507 (codified as amended at
MINN. STAT. § 82.68, subdiv. 3(d) (2012)).
81
See generally supra Part III.
82
Dismuke v. Edina Realty, Inc., No. 92-8716, 1993 WL 327771, at *3 (D. Minn. June 17, 1993)
(applying Minnesota law as it stood at the time finding that the disclosure could not “be
characterized as either a full or adequate disclosure of all the facts under common law.”),
superseded by statute, MINN. STAT. § 82.67, subdiv. 2 (2012).
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the brokerage had breached its fiduciary duty to the plaintiffs—an entire class.83 A later state
court observed the effect of the limited disclosure statutes as they currently stand today when
discussing the Dismuke case.84 In Grady v. Burnet Realty, Inc., the court declined to rely on the
analysis in Dismuke and a related case, because they “did not consider whether a party must
disclose more than what the legislature required.”85 Grady concluded that “disclosure obligations
have been addressed by the legislature” and the legislature had “preempted the common [law] . .
. .”86 In fact, the Grady court could not find any justification for the disclosure of “elaborate
details regarding conflict of interest.”87 In making this statement, the Grady court was referring
to an instance where the agent referred the principal to a title company.88 What is clear is that, in
the court’s opinion, a court is not barred from reviewing the disclosure requirement’s
sufficiency—only that it hasn’t happened yet in a real estate-dual agency context after
Minnesota’s trend of limiting disclosures.89
In 2006, one year before the Grady case, the Minnesota Court of Appeals found
an example of when an agent properly—in the court’s opinion—established and disclosed the
dual agency relationship between a buyer and seller of real estate.90 In Alt v. Mainstreet Lofts,
LLC, the court observed that “[i]n a real estate transaction, dual representation of the buyer and
seller is permitted if the broker makes a full disclosure to all parties to the transaction and obtains
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Id.
Grady v. Burnet Realty, Inc., No. 27-CV-07-3336, 2007 WL 6737282, n.7–8 (Minn. 4th Jud.
Dist. Ct. Dec. 14, 2007).
85
Id. at n.7.
86
Id.
87
Id. at n.8.
88
Id.
89
See id. at n.7.
90
Alt v. Mainstreet Lofts, LLC, No. A05-1476, 2006 WL 1806191, at *11–13 (Minn. Ct. App.
July 3, 2006).
84
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their consent.”91 The court found that the broker satisfied the statutory disclosure requirements
on two forms, both of which were signed by the buyer.92 In siding with the brokerage, the Alt
court observed that “[o]ne of the problems with dual agency . . . is that the [agent’s] prospect of
getting ‘both sides of the commission’ can blind the agent of her fiduciary duties.”93 While the
court correctly observed that this statement merely “describes the nature of the conflict of
interest inherent in a dual-agency agreement,” the court ignores the prospect that such an
omission creates an insufficient disclosure; instead, jumping to the question of breach.94 Perhaps
the court was justified in avoiding the more interesting and complicated question of disclosure
sufficiency, because the appellants failed to contest the issue.95 It is unclear what the court would
have found if the appellants had argued that the statutory disclosure was insufficient because it
did not describe the inherent conflict of interest as to the broker’s motivations for a double
commission.
After the trend of limiting disclosure requirements and courts deferring to the
Legislature, it has become clear that informed consent is what the Legislature says it is. While
simultaneously ignoring the reality that a legislative imposition of knowledge through a standard
form is not the same as actual knowledge. However, this serves a practical purpose. It is difficult
to gauge the subjective understanding of what a dual agency means to any variety of individuals
who may walk into a broker’s door. Individuals who have different priorities may not give any
thought to the dual agency so long as they get their house by an appointed date. The fact of the
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Id. at *11 (citing MINN. STAT. § 82.22, subdiv. 5 (2004); cf. MINN. STAT. § 82.67, subdiv. 1
(2012) (regarding the current requirement for disclosures of the agency relationship).
92
Alt, 2006 WL 1806191, at *12–13.
93
Id.
94
Id. at *13.
95
Id.
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matter is that dual agency is firmly imbedded in Minnesota. It isn’t likely to be abandoned, nor
does this article argue for its abandonment. But just because it is difficult to make an adequate
and full disclosure to the average consumer, that doesn’t mean that lawmakers should shirk the
task in favor of organized brokerages and real estate associations. In reality, the Legislature has
created a rather ambiguous and absurd result. The fact that a case has not arisen to discuss the
sufficiency, ambiguity, absurdity, and misleading disclosure requirement may be more a function
of consumer ignorance stemming from the limited disclosure requirements themselves. The
consumer does not know what the consumer does not know.
IV.
A.

LEGISLATIVE PURPOSE BEHIND MINNESOTA STATUTES, SECTION 82 (2012)

The Overarching Legislative Intent
Section 82 of the Minnesota Statutes does not expressly identify its purposes;

however, the Legislature has given direction in how to ascertain its purpose.96 The guidance the
Legislature provides to courts is currently found in Minnesota Statutes, section 645.97 The
Minnesota Legislature provides some useful presumptions in ascertaining legislative intent that
include:
[T]he legislature does not intend a result that is absurd, impossible of execution,
or unreasonable; the legislature intends the entire statute to be effective and
certain; the legislature does not intend to violate the Constitution of the Unites
States or of this state; when a court of last resort has construed the language of a
law, the legislature in subsequent laws on the same subject matter intends the
same construction to be placed upon such language; and the legislature intends to
favor the public interest as against any private interest.98

96

See MINN. STAT. § 645 (2012).
Id. § 645.17 (providing presumptions for courts to ascertain legislative intent).
98
Id.
97
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The Legislature also has provided that while “[e]very law shall be construed, if possible, to give
effect to all of its provisions. [Absent ambiguity], the letter of the law shall not be disregarded
under the pretext of pursuing the spirit.”99 The Legislature gives further guidance when the
language is found to be ambiguous stating that:
[T]he intention of the legislature can be discovered by considering, among other
matters: 1) the occasion and necessity for the law; 2) the circumstances under
which it was enacted; 3) the mischief to be remedied; 4) the object to be attained;
5) the former law, if any, including other laws upon the same or similar subjects;
6) the consequences of a particular interpretation; 7) the contemporaneous
legislative history; and 8) legislative and administrative interpretations of the
statute.100
Minnesota Statutes, section 645 governs statutory interpretation,101 and as such, it
governs the method of ascertaining legislative purpose, particularly since section 82 does not
expressly indicate the legislative purpose. When the Legislature enacted the law, it was in light
of many years of an established custom of doing business in the real estate industry—the dual
agency relationship.102 Typically, a court only looks to the intent of the legislature when there is
an ambiguity present.103 While there are ambiguities present in the statute,104 a court doesn’t
necessarily have to find an ambiguity in order to ascertain the legislative intent.105 Nor at this
point would it be useful. However, it is useful to go through the considerations listed in sections
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Id. § 645.16.
Id.
101
See id. § 645.001 (providing that the provisions of chapter 645 apply to “all rules becoming
effective after June 30, 1981.”).
102
See supra Part III.
103
See MINN. STAT. § 645.16 (stating that “[w]hen the words of a law are not explicit, the
intention . . . may be ascertained . . . .”).
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See supra Part III.C (discussing the ambiguity in § 82.68, subdiv. 2).
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See infra Part IV.B.
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645.16 and 645.17 to discover the legislative purpose. Under Minnesota Statutes, section
645.16(1)–(8) the purpose is ascertainable as follows:


The “occasion and the necessity for the law” goes mainly to protecting the consumer
from fraudulent agency relationships and incompetent realty brokers.106



The “circumstances under which it was enacted” and “the mischief to be remedied”
appear to be related with the occasion and necessity for the law stated above. There is an
interest in avoiding fraud and apprising the consumer as to the form of agency, else why
would the Legislature regulate the industry and provide disclosures at all?107



The “object to be attained” is probably best ascertained by looking at the language in the
statute. The statute includes licensing requirements, education requirements, sanction
provisions, disclosure provisions, contract provisions, commissioner authority is
discussed, fees and other money matters are clarified, and advertising amongst other
things.108 All of these provisions, taken together, suggest a purpose of protecting the
consumer from fraud, from incompetent agents, and making clear to the consumer that
the Legislature is looking out for them in this protected transaction.



The “former law” demonstrates a trend of limiting disclosure requirements in an apparent
attempt to alleviate agents from liabilities concerning those disclosures and thus
alleviating the court docket.109
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See generally MINN. STAT. § 82 (2012) (providing for real estate broker regulations and
disclosures as to the agency relationship). It may also be fair to say that the Legislature might
have been concerned about alleviating court cases concerning the agency relationship when it
abrogates the common law disclosure requirement. See id. § 82.67, subdiv. 2.
107
However, there is at least a countervailing argument that the limited disclosure trend suggests
an interest in expediting the transaction at the cost of keeping the consumer in the dark.
108
See generally § 82.67, subdiv. 2.
109
See supra note 106 (and accompanying text).
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The “consequences of a particular interpretation,” the “contemporaneous legislative
history” and particularly the “legislative and administrative interpretations” also support
the purpose of protecting the consumer in this type of transaction.110

Given the considerations discussed above, it is logical to conclude that the primary overarching
purpose of section 82 is to protect the consumer in a residential real estate transaction.
B.

Legislative Presumption in Favor of Consumer Protection
However, the list of considerations is not exhaustive,111 nor is it in isolation of the

various presumptions offered in section 645.17. The presumptions have already been cited.112
Under section 645.17(1)–(5) the presumptions are listed as follows:


The Legislature does not intend an “absurd” result, yet it appears absurd that Minnesota
law protects the residential real estate transaction but favors a limited disclosure as to the
agency relationship that brings about that transaction. It appears absurd that in an effort to
make sure that adequate disclosures are given, the law neglects to inform the consumer

See generally MINN. R. 2810.3100, subpt. 12(B) (2007) (discussing an agent’s failure to
disclose as “unfair”). Indeed, the Minnesota Department of Commerce takes violations of
Minnesota Statutes, section 82’s disclosure and technical requirements very seriously. Thomas
A. Bridge, 18122/TK OAH No. 2-1005-22200-2 2011 WL 7945991 (Minn. Dep’t Comm. Aug.
19, 2011) (commencing formal action against a licensee for inter alia the failure to disclose the
agency relationship pursuant to MINN. STAT. § 82.67, subdiv. 3); accord Tara J. Welch,
15228/JEK 2011 WL 7945988 (Minn. Dep’t Comm. Dec. 23, 2011) (commencing formal action
against a licensee for failure to obtain a signed listing agreement in violation of MINN. STAT. §
82.66); CLD Enters., LLC, 16869/JEK/GM 2010 WL 3245349 (Minn. Dep’t Comm. July 6,
2010) (commencing formal action against a licensee for fraudulent, deceptive, or dishonest
practices giving rise the licensee’s incompetence, untrustworthiness, or financial
irresponsibility).
111
MINN. STAT. § 645.16 (2012) (noting that the list is not exhaustive given the preceding phrase
“among other matters”).
112
See supra notes 96–97.
110
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that he or she has both a power and a right to control the agent, including as to the form
of the agency throughout the relationship.113


While the Legislature may intend for “the entire statute to be effective and certain,” that
simply is not the case. There is ambiguous language found in section 82.68 subdivision
3,114 which leads to uncertainty. Furthermore, the defined term “licensee” is used to refer
to different parties within the definition of dual agency itself.115 In section 82.55
subdivision 6 (1) a “licensee” refers to either a broker or a salesperson, while in (2) the
word “licensee” only refers to a salesperson.



Perhaps most significant, the presumption that “the legislature intends to favor the public
interest as against any private interest” is compromised. A fair reading of Minnesota
Statutes, section 82 does not favor the public interest vis-à-vis any private interest. The
limited disclosure form requires only that the form “substantially” follow the statutory
scheme gives brokerages room to leave out or include alternate language.116 The
definition of a dual agency makes it easier for a brokerage to claim its double
commission due to its dual agency-designated agency combination. Under the designated
agency situation there is nothing to prevent the buyer’s salesperson and the seller’s
salesperson from sharing all information with each other outside the view of the
consumers.117 The preprinted forms ignore the common law of agency that still applies in

113

See MINN. STAT. §§ 82.66–.68 (2012) (omitting entirely from the disclosure requirement the
concept of principal control over the agent).
114
See supra note 75.
115
Id. §§ 82.55, subdivs. 6 & 10.
116
See id. § 82.67, subdiv. 1.
117
The contractual notice requirement states that information about price, terms and motivation
will not be shared, but “[a]ll other information will be shared.” See id. § 82.66, subdiv. 9. The
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regards to control of the agent. The contractual notice itself is designed to induce a
consumer to consent to the dual agency.118 All of these factors demonstrate that the
language of the law heavily favors the private brokerages vis-à-vis the consumer. Such a
condition flies in the face of the overall purposes of the law and is the essence of
absurdity.119
Taken together, the presumptions found in Minnesota Statutes, section 645.17(1)–(5) are
frustrated by the language found in section 82 as described above. After considering both the
presumptions and intent of the Legislature, the primary purpose of section 82 is still to protect
the consumer. Yet the statutory language fails the consumer in Minnesota.
C.

Minnesota Statutes, Section 82 Purpose Evaded: Discussing Minnesota Law
Even before Minnesota Statutes, section 645 was enacted, the Minnesota Supreme

Court has attempted to ascertain the overall purpose behind a piece of legislation—absent
ambiguity—to see if the legislative purpose is evaded.120 After the enactment of section 645,
Minnesota courts have looked to it for guidance on how to interpret legislative purpose, with
much to the same effect. The Minnesota Court of Appeals noted that “[w]hen a statute is free

statute does not restrict information from being shared between salespersons outside the view of
the consumers. Id.
118
See id. § 82.66, subdivs. 1(9) & 2(7). The listing agreement language states: “However, if the
seller(s) should decide not to agree to a possible dual agency, and the seller(s) want broker to
represent the seller(s), the seller(s) may give up the opportunity to sell the property to buyers
represented by broker.” Concluding the notice in this fashion induces a seller to agree because no
reasonable seller would want to limit his pool of buyers. Id.
119
See infra Part IV.B.
120
See Judd v. Landin, 211 Minn. 465, 469–71, 1 N.W. 861, 863–864 (1942). Judd instructs that
“[i]t is an old and unshaken rule in the construction of statutes * * * that the intention of a
remedial statute will always prevail over the literal sense of its terms . . . .” Id. at 470, 864.
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from ambiguity, we look only at its plain language,”121 and that it is the “[p]lain and
unambiguous statutory language [that] manifests legislative intent.”122 Conversely, when a
statute is ambiguous, the “[court] must determine and give effect to the intent of the
legislature.”123 Whether there is ambiguity or not, the court is to construe—if it must at all—the
language in the context of the whole chapter.124 In an instance where the statute is not ambiguous
but deals with a “failure of expression,” the Minnesota Supreme Court has noted “‘courts are not
free to substitute amendment for construction and thereby supply the omissions of the
legislature.’”125—at least in this criminal law context. Yet even in criminal law, the common law
is known to aid a court in interpreting and applying criminal statutes.126
For instance, in Genin v. 1996 Mercury Marquis, the court noted that the relevant
statute was “silent as to who bears responsibility for any accrued storage fees.”127 The court also
noted that in comparing two related statutes, “[w]here one section of a statute contains a
particular provision, omission of the same provision from a similar section is significant to show
different legislative intent for the two sections.”128 Similarly, to suppose that the use of the word
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In re Estate of Nordlund, 609 N.W.2d 910, 913 (Minn. App. Ct. 1999) (citing MINN. STAT. §
645.16 (1998)).
122
Id. (citing Klein Bancorporation, Inc. v. Commissioner of Revenue, 581 N.W.2d 863, 866
(Minn. App. Ct. 1998).
123
Id. (citing MINN. STAT. § 645.16).
124
Id. (citing Minneapolis Police Officers Fed’n v. City of Minneapolis, 481 N.W.2d 372, 374
(Minn. App. Ct. 1992) (observing that statutes relating to the same issue or having a common
purpose should be construed together), review denied (Minn. Apr. 6, 1992)).
125
Genin v. 1996 Mercury Marquis, 622 N.W.2d 114, 117 (Minn. 2001) (citing State v. Moseng,
254 Minn. 263, 269, 95 N.W.2d 6, 11–12 (1959).
126
21 AM. JUR. 2D Criminal Law § 10 (2013) (on construction of statutes).
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Genin, 622 N.W.2d 114, 117.
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Id. at 118 (citing 2A Norman J Singer, Sutherland Statutory Construction: Statutes and
Statutory Construction § 46.07 (6th ed. 2000).
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“broker,” a defined term in its own right, also means “salesperson,” also a defined term, in the
contractual notice required under section 82.66 is not tenable.129
However, the Minnesota Supreme Court instructs that it may, under certain
circumstances, disregard the unambiguous language of a statute in favor of pursuing the purpose
when “the plain meaning utterly confounds a clear legislative purpose.”130 It is a rare instance
where the court will disregard unambiguous language in favor of serving the purpose of the
statute, in fact, the court observed that it only happened once so far,131 but that was in 1993,
before the trend of limiting disclosures to the consumer. The only time such an instance has
occurred, was in Wegner v. Commissioner of Revenue, where the court held that it was “equally
obliged to reject a construction that leads to absurd results or unreasonable results which utterly
depart from the purpose of the statute.”132 Even though there is a high standard to reach for the
court to disregard plain language, that standard can and should be attainable when looking at the
language in section 82.
To show an instance where unambiguous language can be disregarded, an
evaluation of Auto Owners Ins. Co. v. Perry is helpful.133 Perry involves a dispute about the
definition of the word “dependent” under the Minnesota No-Fault Insurance Act.134 Perry, the
unwed survivor of her partner, sued the insurance company after it denied her claim because she
was not a “dependent.” The insurance company argued Perry was not entitled to payment under
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See infra notes 142–46.
Weston v. McWilliams & Assocs., 716 N.W.2d 634, 639 (Minn. 2006) (quoting Mut. Serv.
Cas. Ins. Co. v. League of Minn. Cities, 659 N.W.2d 755, 760 (Minn. 2003).
131
See Schatz v. Interfaith Care Ctr., 811 N.W.2d 643, 651–52 (Minn. 2012).
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505 N.W.2d 612, 617 (Minn. 1993).
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749 N.W.2d 324 (Minn. 2008).
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Id. at 325.
130
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the policy because she was not a surviving spouse or child—a requirement to qualify as a
“surviving dependent.”135 Perry contended that a phrase in the policy that stated “[q]uestions of
the existence and the extent of dependency shall be questions of fact . . . .” meant that there is a
“class of provable dependents . . . other than surviving spouses . . . .”136 Ultimately, the court
found the language of the statute unambiguous,137 and found for the insurance company.138 In
reaching that conclusion, the court noted that the purpose behind the act was, “inter alia, ‘to
relieve the severe economic distress of uncompensated victims to automobile accidents within
this state, to speed administration of justice, and to ease the burden of litigation on the
courts.’”139 In Perry, the court had the luxury of a purpose statement in the Act itself.140
Perry is instructive because it illustrates reasoning for the opposite result when
discussing the dual agency notice found in a listing or buyer’s agreement with a broker. Both
situations involve a contract. Both instances involve words that are not, by themselves,
ambiguous.141 However, the language in the notice of a dual agency for the contract with a real
estate broker does utterly conflict with the purpose of section 82, giving rise to an absurd result
the Legislature could not have intended—namely, misleading the consumer.
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Id.
Id. at 326.
137
Id. at 327.
138
Id. at 329. (finding that the language was unambiguous, and that Perry was not entitled to her
partner’s survivor’s economic loss benefit under the Minnesota No-Fault Insurance Act).
139
Id. at 328–29. (citing to MINN. STAT. § 65B.42 (2006), which is the purpose statement for the
Act).
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MINN. STAT. § 65B. 42 (2006).
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At least the majority of section 82 is not ambiguous on its face.
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The dual agency notice—as written—for a listing agreement or buyer’s agreement
only pertains to a dual agency in which the broker is the agent.142 This matters because the
agency relationship, as defined in section 82.55 subdivision 6, is not as to the brokerage firm, but
is only as to the particular licensee.143 A “licensee” is clearly defined as a “person,” not a firm.144
Furthermore, the word “broker” is defined also as a “person,” not a firm.145 As mentioned before,
the word “licensee” does not have the same meaning throughout the definition of a dual
agency.146 If the Legislature intended to mean that a dual agency arises where a person with a
broker’s license represents both the buyer and the seller in the same transaction and where two or
more salespersons licensed to the same broker (one representing the seller and the other
representing the buyer) then the notice required in the listing and buyer’s agreements are absurd
on their face. They are absurd on their face because they exclude the second circumstance in
which a dual agency arises by omitting salespersons altogether. This absurdity results in a
misleading notice that is used to secure the consumers informed consent to the dual agency.
Furthermore, it is well settled law that an agent cannot delegate to its subagents more authority
than what the agent has.147 Yet, under the second prong of the dual agency definition, a

See MINN. STAT. § 82.66, subdivs. 1 (9), 2 (7) (2012) (using the word “broker,” while
omitting the word “salesperson.”).
143
See id. § 82.55, subdiv. 6. Although a brokerage may make a business decision to create the
agency relationship as to the brokerage firm in its written agreement—that is not how the statute
reads.
144
See id. § 82.55, subdiv. 10.
145
See id. § 82.55, subdiv. 19. Similarly, the word “salesperson” is defined and refers to a natural
person only. See id. § 82.55, subdiv. 20.
146
See MINN. STAT. § 82.55, subdiv. 6 (2012). Compare id. § 82.55, subdiv. 6(1) (using the word
“licensee” to mean a person with a broker’s license and/or a salesperson), with id. § 82.55,
subdiv. 6(2) (using the word “licensee” to refer exclusively to a salesperson).
147
See Morrison v. Swenson, 142 N.W.2d 640, 641 (Minn. 1966) (noting that subagents may
bind the principal to the same extent as the agent), superseded on other grounds Graff v. Robert
142
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salesperson is purported to have the added authority to negotiate on behalf of a consumer, while
the broker-dual agent never had that authority to begin with.
Just as the Perry court observed, “[i]t would be anomalous for the legislature to
create a broad class of provable dependents and then fail to delineate a standard by which
payments to members of that class terminate.”148 So too would it be anomalous for the legislature
to create a broad definition of a dual agency in the definition section and then limit the scope of
the dual agency to persons with a broker’s license in the contractual notice required to be
included and used to evidence informed consent to the dual agency. Yet that is precisely what the
language does, unfortunately, the omissions and absurdities do not stop there.
The Minnesota Legislature requires that every listing agreement or buyers
agreement with a broker contain a dual agency notice,149 in addition to the agency disclosure
form at the first substantive contact with the consumer.150 Both notices for the listing agreement
and the buyer’s agreement are substantially the same—the listing agreement notice reads as
follows:
If a buyer represented by broker wishes to buy the seller’s property, a dual agency
will be created. This means that broker will represent both the seller(s) and the
buyer(s), and owe the same duties to the buyer(s) that broker owes to the seller(s).
This conflict of interest will prohibit broker from advocating exclusively on the
seller’s behalf. Dual agency will limit the level of representation broker can
provide. If a dual agency should arise, the seller(s) will need to agree that
confidential information about price, terms, and motivation will still be kept
confidential unless the seller(s) instruct broker in writing to disclose specific
M. Swendra Agency, Inc., 800 N.W.2d 112 (Minn. 2011). In fact, generally when a fiduciary
agent delegates authority that he does not have to a subagent and the subagent acts beyond the
scope of the agent’s authority, the subagent could be susceptible to liability. RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF AGENCY § 18 cmt. d (1958).
148
Auto Owners Ins. Co. v. Perry, 749 N.W.2d 324, 327 (Minn. 2008).
149
MINN. STAT. § 82.66, subdiv. 1 (b) (9), subdiv. 2 (b) (7) (2012).
150
Id. § 82.67, subdiv. 3.
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information about the seller(s). All other information will be shared. Broker
cannot act as a dual agent unless both the seller(s) and the buyer(s) agree to it. By
agreeing to a possible dual agency, the seller(s) will be giving up the right to
exclusive representation in an in-house transaction. However, if the seller(s)
should decide not to agree to a possible dual agency, and the seller(s) want broker
to represent the seller(s), the seller(s) may give up the opportunity to sell the
property to buyers [sic] represented by broker.
Seller’s Instructions to Broker
Having read and understood this information about dual agency, seller(s)
now instructs broker as follows:
Seller(s) will agree . . . .
Seller(s) will not agree . . . .
[signature block omitted]151
The mandatory notice in the listing agreement is hypothetical and indefinite. It does not
guarantee that a dual agency will arise, it only provides that it may arise. In fact, the way it is
worded it apparently automatically arises and without indicating any need for further notice or
approval.152 Furthermore, when such a notice is imbedded in the middle of an entire contract it
gives the appearance of absolute enforceability. This results in a situation where that the average
consumer will likely think that if a dual agency actually arises, the consumer can do nothing
about it without breaching the entire agreement.
As mentioned above, one of the hallmarks of the agency relationship is the
principal’s control over the agent.153 Control is needed to form the agency relationship in the first
instance,154 yet control does not end there.155 There is also a right of continued control
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Id. § 82.66, subdiv. 1(b)(9).
Although the purchase agreement will also contain an agency notice.
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See supra Part II.A.
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Id.
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See supra Part IV.B. (discussing continued control in terms of power and right).
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throughout the agency relationship.156 However, since real estate transactions require that the
agency agreement be put in writing,157 there is a contractual overlay imposed on the agency
relationship that governs the agency. While this contract will govern the rights that are
applicable to the principal-agent relationship, the contract does not restrict the powers of control
the principal has over the agent.158 In the typical dispute the issue will be whether or not the
principal has the right to discontinue the agency relationship. In the context of a real estate
broker acting as a dual agent, the dispute should not rest on whether the agency should be
discontinued, but modified from a dual agency to a single agency at the option of the principal—
even after executing a listing agreement or buyer’s agreement with the broker.
In the introductory note to the Second Restatement of Agency, the drafters
contemplated the principal’s power to modify the agency relationship. In discussing actual and
apparent authority and distinguishing agency from contract law, “there may be an implicit
modification if the changes are such that the agent should know the principal would not wish him
to act, or [act] with some modifications.”159 Furthermore, upon the principal’s notice to the
agent, that “he should infer that the principal does not wish him to act as originally specified, the
agent’s authority is . . . modified accordingly.”160 In a modification as to the form of agency, an
agent is not entitled to damages arising from such modification because the principal is not
terminating the agreement, only modifying the manner in which the agent achieves the purpose
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RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 14, cmt. a (1958).
See MINN. STAT. § 82.66 (2012).
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Infra note 170.
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RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY Intro. Note (1958).
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Id. § 14, cmt. a.
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of the agency.161 In fact, an agent “cannot recover damages for losses which, in the exercise of
due diligence, he could have avoided.”162 An agent is entitled to no compensation whatsoever for
“conduct which is disobedient . . . if such conduct constitutes a willful and deliberate breach of
his contract of service . . . .”163 As stated before, the statutory disclosure requirements go to the
informed consent and the actual formation of the agency relationship,164 nothing more. The
statute does not purport to abrogate the common law rule of continued control of the principal
over his agent.165 If there is a dual agency and the principal initially consents to that form of
agency, then the principal’s control over the agent is limited by contract; however, that does not
mean that the principal is not free to change the form of the agency from a dual agency to a
single agency at the discretion of the principal during the course of the agency relationship,
without breaching the contract, before closing.
Not surprisingly, there are few cases in Minnesota that deal with a principal’s
modification as to the form of the agency after the execution of a contract forming the
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In an instance where changing the form of agency results in a breach of the contract, the
consumer should be shielded from liability by statute pre-closing. This makes sense because the
broker can continue to represent the consumer(s) on both sides of the transaction even after the
change in the form of agency and even though one consumer’s election to alter the agency
impacts the other party under a dual agency. The fact that a broker may have his commission
reduced should not impede the consumer’s right to control his broker. In any event, under the
current law in Minnesota, a brokerage firm that has salespersons would not lose out on the
double commission because the firm, if it elects to create the agency as to the firm, may then
designate a salesperson to represent the seller and another salesperson to represent the buyer. See
generally MINN. STAT. § 82.55, subdiv. 6 (2012).
162
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 455 cmt. d (1958) (discussing avoidable damages); see
also RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF CONTRACTS § 336 (1932) (citing the same standard).
163
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 469 (1958).
164
See supra Part III.C; MINN. STAT. § 82.67, subdiv. 2 (2012) (abrogating only the common law
disclosure requirement).
165
§ 82.67, subdiv. 2.
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relationship. However, one Minnesota Supreme Court case is illustrative of the general rule
regarding a unilateral modification of a listing agreement. In Klawitter v. Billick, the principal
unilaterally modified an exclusive listing agreement changing the price of the land and the
agent’s authority to sell the land, under the modified agreement, which was extended by thirty
days.166 In determining whether or not the principal has the right to modify the listing agreement,
the Minnesota Supreme Court observed that first, “a broker’s expenditures of time or money to
find a purchaser is sufficient consideration for the promise to pay a commission and makes the
agreement bilateral and binding,”167 and secondly, “[s]ince the listing agreement was an
enforceable bilateral contract, it follows that the [principal] did not have a unilateral right to
modify its terms.”168 However, where there is only an “executory agreement” the principal may
unilaterally modify the agreement without fear of any liability.169 The court takes special care to
distinguish between a principal’s right to alter an agreement with his broker with the power to do
so.170 The power is absolute as a matter of agency law. The right to do so is a function of the
agreement’s terms or other applicable law.171 In Klawitter, the principal did not have the right to
alter the listing agreement and was therefore held liable to the agent for any entitled damages, 172
although the principal did have the power to alter the listing agreement and therefore the agent
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308 Minn. 325, 331, 242 N.W.2d 588, 593 (1976).
Id. at 330, 592.
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Id. (emphasis added).
169
Id. An executory contract is defined as one that will be performed in the future. BLACK’S LAW
DICTIONARY 369 (9th ed. 2009); but see 12 AM. JUR. 2D Brokers § 62 (2013) (noting that where
there is sufficient reciprocity of consideration the principal cannot unilaterally alter the
agreement without added consideration moving to the adversely affected party).
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was bound to act only as provided by the modified agreement.173 But that is not the end of the
story, as the Minnesota Supreme Court noted:
In some circumstances a principal may escape liability for his unilateral
modification or renunciation of a listing agreement [beyond the executory
contract exception] if his action was not ‘arbitrary’ or in ‘bad faith’—e.g., for the
purpose of depriving the broker of his commission—but, rather, is based on a
‘reasonable cause.’174
While a principal changing his mind as to whether or not to sell a property is not
reasonable cause,175 a principal changing his mind as to the form of agency relationship with his
real estate agent, before closing, should be as a matter of law. The principal that initially
consents to a dual agency, for whatever reason, may soon find that negotiations with the other
side have stalled. If the principal is bound to the dual agency, he has no one to advocate for
him.176 Given the nature of the transaction, a principal should not be shackled to a form of
agency that encourages direct negotiation with the other side against the principal’s better
judgment.177 Furthermore, a principal should be apprised of that reality in the statutorily required
disclosure form and notice. This makes sense because the statutory requirements governing the
real estate broker’s relationship with clients is “subject to the general rules governing the
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Id. at 331–32, 593.
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Id. at 332, 593.
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See MINN. STAT. § 82.67, subdiv. 4 (2012).
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A residential real estate transaction can be filled with high emotions and expectations that can
turn a once blissful experience into a nightmare. Consumers understand what is at stake and the
importance of a competent advocate. Such a change in attitudes between seller and buyer and a
desire to be represented exclusively coupled with a broker’s inability to do so should be
considered a material change in circumstances. This material change in circumstances warrants
rescission of the principal’s consent to the dual agency form. Such a rescission is in keeping with
Ohio’s statute that permits rescission to a dual agency form when there is a material change in
information. See infra Part V.
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principal agent relationship” upon the execution of a listing agreement.178 This conclusion is also
supportable in that “[w]here a broker claims the seller has prevented his performance, [the
broker] must show that the seller has deprived [the broker] of the opportunity to procure a
purchaser . . . .”179 The result that this article proposes, does not prevent a broker from procuring
a purchaser and earning his commission, only the manner in which the broker serves his client to
that end.
Excluding a statement from the agency notice and disclosure that addresses the
consumer’s right and power to alter the form of agency during the representation flies in the face
of the statutory purpose to protect the consumer. Part of protecting a consumer is the appraisal of
vital rights and privileges surrounding the transaction. The omission is not excusable, nor should
it be left to the average consumer to discover which agency principles persist and which have
been abrogated.
V.

PULSE OF THE NATION: HOW OTHER STATES VIEW THE RISKY DUAL AND DESIGNATED
AGENCY RELATIONSHIP IN RESIDENTIAL REALTY TRANSACTIONS
Looking at the statutes of all fifty states that govern the agency relationship in a

realty transaction, there is a sense of how risky the various jurisdictions view dual and designated
agencies. Omitting other forms of agency the various states provide, such as single or facilitator
relationships, eleven states currently provide for a “dual agency” only,180 four states provide only
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White v. Boucher, 322 N.W.2d 560, 564 (1982).
Century 21-Birdsell Realty, Inc. v. Hiebel, 379 N.W.2d 201, 203 (Minn. Ct. App. 1985).
180
States that provide only for a dual agency include:
Alabama. ALA. CODE § 34-27-82(a) (current through the end of the 2013 Reg. Sess.).
Arizona. Manley v. Ticor Title Ins. Co., 816 P.2d 225, 229–30 (Ariz. 1991) (Permitting
dual agency and observing that it is not by itself equivalent of acting adversely).
Arkansas. ARK. CODE ANN. § 17-42-316(b)(2)(G) (West, current through the end of the
2013 Reg. Sess.).
179
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California. CAL. CIV. CODE § 2079.13(d) (West, current through the 2013 Reg. Sess.)
(defining “dual agent”); CAL. CIV. CODE § 2079.16 (West, current through the 2013 Reg. Sess.)
(providing for dual agency disclosure requirement).
Hawaii. HAW. CODE R. § 16-99-3.1(g) (current through the Haw. Admin. R. Listing of
Filings Sept. 2013) (requiring consent and written disclosure regarding the dual agency).
Minnesota. MINN. STAT. § 82.55, subdiv. 6 (2012) (defining“dual agency”).
Mississippi. MISS. CODE ANN. § 89-1-519 (West, current through the end of the 2013
Reg. Sess.) (permitting dual representation when it is done by agreement). See also Palmer v.
Pittman, 90 So. 3d 84, 87 (Miss. Ct. App. 2011) (observing same standard).
New Jersey. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 45:15-17(b) (West, current with laws effective through
2013). See also Coldwell Banker Commercial Real Estate Servs. v. Wilson, 700 F.Supp. 1340,
1346 (D. N.J. 1988) (observing that dual representation need be cured with consent).
Ohio. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 4735.70 & 4735.71(A) (West, current through 2013).
Utah. UTAH ADMIN. CODE r. 162-2f-401a(3) & (4) (2013) (providing for a substantive
dual agency under the title “limited agent”).
West Virginia. W. VA. CODE ANN. § 30-40-26(d) (West, current with the laws of the
2013 First Extraordinary Sess.).
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for a “designated agency,”181 thirty-one states provide for both,182 while four states do not permit
either.183 At first glance, it appears that very few, only four, really are adverse to the dual agency

181

The states that provide only for a designated agency include:
Alaska. Alaska provides for a “neutral licensee” to get around the problems of the dual
agency relationship. ALASKA STAT. ANN. § 08.88.600(b)–(c) (West, current through the 2013 1st
Reg. Sess.). However, the state also provides expressly for a designated agency. Id. §
08.88.600(d).
Colorado. COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12-61-803(6)(c) (West, current through the First
Reg. Sess. (2013)), but see id. § 12-61-803(6)(d) (permitting one broker to be designated to
“work for both” parties to the transaction as a “transaction-broker”).
Kansas. Defines designated agency. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 58-30,102(k) (West, current
through 2013). Kansas also expressly permits designated agency. Id. § 58-30,109(b)(1).
Wyoming. Provides a definition for a “designated licensee” (but not a dual agent). WYO.
STAT. ANN. § 33-28-102(vx) (West, current through the 2013 Gen. Sess.). The state also provides
expressly for a designated agency. Id. § 33-28-302(h).
182
The states that provide for both a dual agency and a designated agency include:
Connecticut. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 20-325g (West, current with Pub. Acts of the
2013 Jan. Reg. Sess.) (providing for dual agency); id. § 20-325i (providing for designated
agency).
Delaware. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 24, § 2936(a) & (e)(9) (West, current through 79 Laws
2013) (providing for designated and dual agency respectively).
Georgia. GA. CODE ANN. § 10-6A-12 (West, current through the end of the 2013 Reg.
Sess.) (providing for dual agency); id. 10-6A-13(a) (providing for designated agency).
Idaho. IDAHO CODE ANN. § 54-2084(2)(c)–(d) (West, current through 2013).
Illinois. 225 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 454/15-50 (West, current through P.A. 98-450 of the
2013 Reg. Sess.) (providing for designated agency); id. 454/15-45 (providing for dual agency).
Indiana. IND. CODE ANN. § 25-34.1-10-12 (West current through 2013) (providing for a
dual agency under the term “limited agent”); id. § 25-34.1-10.6.5 (providing for a designated
agency under the term “in house agency relationship”).
Iowa. IOWA CODE ANN. § 543B.59(1)–(2) (West, current with legislation from the 2013
Reg. Sess.).
Kentucky. KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 324.121 (West, current through the end of the 2013
reg. sess.) (providing for both dual and designated agency).
Louisiana. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:3897 (West, current through 2013) (providing for
dual agency); id. § 9:3892 (providing for designated agency).
Maine. ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 32, §§ 13275(1) & 13278(1) (current through the 2013
First Reg. Sess.). (providing for dual and designated agency respectively).
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Maryland. MD. CODE ANN., BUS. OCC. & PROF. § 17-530(a)(4)–(5) & (c)–(d) (West,
current through the 2013 Reg. Sess.) (providing for dual and designated agency); id. § 17-546(a)
(identifying designated agents as “intracompany agents”).
Massachusetts. MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 112, § 87AAA3/4(b) & (c) (West, current
through 2013 of the 1st Annual Sess.) (providing for dual and designated agency respectively).
Michigan. Provides for dual agency and affiliated licensees. MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. §
339.2517 (West, current through P.A.2013 of the 2013 Reg. Sess.) (disclosure requirement).
Missouri. MO. ANN. STAT. § 339.750(1) (West, current through the end of 2013 First
Reg. Sess.) (providing for dual agency); id. § 339.780 (providing for designated agency).
Montana. MONT. CODE ANN. § 37-51-102(10), (12) & (13) (West, current through July
1, 2013) (defining dual agency and designated agency relationships with buyer and seller).
Nebraska. NEB. REV. STAT. ANN. § 76-2419 (West, current through the Second Reg.
Sess. (2012)) (permitting dual agency); id. § 76-2420 (permitting designated agents).
Nevada. Requires that the agent get the consent of all parties to the transaction for a dual
agency. NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 645.252(1)(d) (West, current through the 2011 Reg. Sess.).
Nevada also permits a designated agency—but without a consent requirement. Id. § 645.253.
New Hampshire. N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 331-A:25-d(I) & 331-A:25-e(I) (current
through the 2013 Reg. Sess.) (providing for dual and designated agency respectively).
New Mexico. Permits a variety of agency relationships, including but not limited to
designated and dual agency. N.M. CODE R. § 16.61.19.9 (2013). The state also outlines the dual
agency relationship in the same statute. Id. § 16.61.19.10.
New York. N.Y. REAL PROP. LAW § 443(1)(i) & (j) (McKinney, current through L.2013)
(providing definitions and disclosure form).
North Carolina. 21 N.C. ADMIN. CODE 58A.0104(d) & (j) (2013) (providing for dual
and designated agency respectively).
North Dakota. N.D. CENT. CODE ANN. § 43-23-12.3(1)–(3) (West, current through the
2013 Reg. Sess.) (providing for both dual and designated agency).
Oregon. Provides for both dual and designated agency as dual representation. OR. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 696.815 (West, current through the 2013 Reg. Sess.).
Pennsylvania. 63 PA. CONS. STAT. § 455.606 (current through the 2013 Reg. Sess.).
Rhode Island. R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. §§ 5-20.5-6 & 5-20.5-14(7) (West, current through
the 2013 Reg. Sess.). See also RHODE ISLAND MANDATORY REAL ESTATE RELATIONSHIP
DISCLOSURE FORM (providing for designated agency and a “Dual Neutral Facilitator”), available
at http://www.dbr.state.ri.us/documents/divisions/commlicensing/realestate/REDisclosure_Form.pdf.
South Carolina. S.C. CODE ANN. § 40-57-137(A)(3) & (P)(1) (West, current through the
end of 2012 Reg. Sess.) (providing for dual and designated agency respectively).
South Dakota. S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 36-21A-141.1 (2013) (describing both dual and
designated agency in terms of a limited agent and appointed licensee respectively).
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Tennessee. TENN. CODE ANN. § 62-13-402 (West, current through the end of the 2013
First reg. Sess.) (providing for a dual agency termed as “limited agency”); id. § 62-13-406
(permitting designated agency).
Virginia. VA. CODE ANN. § 54.1-2139(A) (West, current through the end of the 2013
Reg. Sess. and end of the 2013 Sp. Sess. I) (providing for dual agency); id. § 54.1-2139.1(A)
(providing for designated agency).
Washington. WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 18.86.020(1)(c) & (2) (West, current through
2013) (providing for both dual and designated agency).
Wisconsin. WIS. STAT. ANN. § 452.134(2)–(3) (West, current through 2013).
183
The states that do not permit either dual agency or designated agency include:
Florida. Florida provides only for a single agency or a transaction broker relationship.
FLA. STAT. ANN. § 475.278(1) & (2) (West, current through the end of the 2013 1st Reg. Sess.)
Note that a dual or designated agent actually has some limited fiduciary duties to the principal,
while in Florida, the transactional broker does not represent a principal as a fiduciary.
Oklahoma. Oklahoma provides for either a single agency or a transactional brokerage
relationship. OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 59, § 858-352 (West, current through the First Reg. Sess.
2013). While a cursory look at Oklahoma law might initially look like a brokerage can represent
both parties to the transaction—that is not true. The brokerage has duties to both parties to the
transaction and may provide “brokerage services” to both parties to the transaction. Act effective
Nov. 1, 2013 ch. 240, §§ 3 & 4 2013 Okla. Sess. Serv. 1245 (West) (codified as amended at
OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 59, §§ 858-353 & 858-355.1 (2013)). “Brokerage services” are defined by
the statute and do not include the establishment of the agency relationship. Id. § 2, 2013 Okla.
Sess. Law Serv. 1245 (codified as amended at OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 59, § 858-351 (2013)). A
transaction broker essentially acts only to facilitate the mechanics of the transaction and ensure
the statutory disclosure requirements are complied with. Id. §§ 2 & 3, 2013 Okla. Sess. Law
Serv. 1245 (codified as amended at OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 59, §§ 858-351 & 858-353 (2013)). Cf.
OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 59, § 858-359 (West, current through the First Reg. Sess. of 2013) (noting
that not even a promise to pay the broker is indicative of an agency formation).
Texas. TEX. OCC. CODE ANN. § 1101.558 (West, current through the end of the 2013
Third Called Sess.) (providing for a single agency, sub agency, and intermediary only) see also
id. § 1101.652(b)(16) (providing that the commissioner may discipline a broker or salesperson
for acting in a dual capacity and undisclosed principal).
Vermont. Vermont is rather unique. It prohibits outright dual agency, yet it will permit
the dual agency—renamed as a “limited agency”—only in circumstances where the firm already
represents both parties in separate transactions and then the principals decide to be involved in
the same transaction. 20-4 VT. CODE R. § 1800(4.4) (current through Sept. 2013) (cited on
Westlaw as VT. ADMIN. CODE § 20-4-1800:4).
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or designated agency concepts. The difference between the Minnesota dual agency statute and
those of many other states, is that the statutes found elsewhere tend to be better written. Looking
across the nation, there are statutes that do abrogate all of the common law of agency, there are
more robust disclosure requirements, and some protective measures are put in place where
information is not shared between salespersons.184 Minnesota is lagging behind. If Minnesota is
to permit dual agency at all, the time has come for Minnesota to do it well—insomuch as that is
even possible.
Texas, for example, finds that the purpose behind its Real Estate License Act “is
to eliminate or reduce fraud that might be occasioned on the public by unlicensed, unscrupulous,
or unqualified persons.”185 In addition to protecting the public from fraud, Texas views the
purpose of its Act is “‘to guarantee fidelity and honesty of the real estate salesman in his dealings
with the public and to insure and indemnify any member of the public against damages or
injuries caused by a violation of this Act.’”186 In short, the purpose is to protect the consumer and
public—just like Minnesota’s law.187 One interesting tool that Texas uses is a committee of
brokers and lawyers that “drafts and revise[s] contract forms” in order to “expedite real estate
transactions and minimize controversy.”188 Additionally, the committee is instructed that any
“[c]ontract forms must contain safeguards adequate to protect the principals in the
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See generally supra notes 180 & 183.
Henry S. Miller Co. v. Treo Enters., 585 S.W.2d 674, 675–76 (Tex. 1979) (referring to the
then Real Estate Licensing Act). The current Act is under TEX. OCC. CODE ANN. § 1101.001
(West, current through the end of the 2013 Third Called Sess.).
186
State v. Pace, 640 S.W.2d 432, 433 (Tex. App. 1982).
187
See supra Part IV.A. (discussing the purpose of MINN. STAT. § 82 (2012)).
188
TEX. OCC. CODE ANN. § 1101.254(a) (West, current through the end of the 2013 Third Called
Sess.).
185
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transaction.”189 Granted, Texas does not permit either a dual or designated agency like most
other states, yet if there was such a committee in Minnesota that could create and edit standard
forms that protected the consumer, the legislative purpose of Minnesota Statutes, section 82
might be better served.
Ohio is a state that permits dual agency, just like Minnesota. Under Ohio law,
there is a more robust definition of a dual agent.190 Furthermore, Ohio recognizes the inherent
riskiness of the conflict and deals with it by requiring for not only an amplified disclosure, but
providing for the common law principal of continued control as to the form of the agency. Ohio
law requires the consumer to have “full knowledge of the dual representation” followed by
“consent in writing.”191 However, before that consent can be given the statute requires the agent
must disclose “all relevant information necessary to enable each party to make an informed
decision” about whether or not to enter the dual agency relationship.192 The law also requires,
after consent to the dual agency is given, if a “material change in the information” occurs, it must
be disclosed and the consumer is given a chance to “revoke consent.”193 Furthermore, in the case
of dual agency, where a licensee discovers confidential information about another client of the
brokerage, the licensee is prohibited from disclosing it or using that information to aid the
licensee’s own client.194 That is in stark contrast to Minnesota’s rule which prohibits confidential
information from being disclosed, but says nothing about whether or not the licensee can use it
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Id. § 1101.254(b).
Compare OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 4735.70 (West, current through 2013), with MINN. STAT. §
82.55, subdiv. 6 (2012).
191
OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 4735.71(A) (West, current through 2013).
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Id.
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Id.
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Id. § 4735.72(E)(3).
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once discovered.195 When looking at the disclosure requirements of Ohio and Minnesota, there is
little comparison. Ohio provides much greater protections than Minnesota even though they both
provide for dual agency.
A final example comes from Delaware, where the law provides that the statutory
agency relationship is only a default rule. If the parties agree, the common law can govern the
agency relationship.196 Delaware law appropriately recognizes that a consumer might understand
the risks and opt out of the statutory default in favor of greater protections. Minnesota law, in
contrast, shackles the consumer to its statutory scheme in a “state-knows-best manner.”197
Another useful Delaware provision is a disclaimer of the common law principle of imputed
knowledge in an agency relationship.198 Minnesota’s statute does not disclaim imputed
knowledge.199 At best, Minnesota law remains unsettled as to this type of imputation.200
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See MINN. STAT. §§ 82.66–67 (2012) (providing that the licensee cannot disclose confidential
information regarding price, motivation, and terms but the statute says nothing about using that
information without disclosing). Arguing that such a requirement is implied is unpersuasive. The
legislature is presumed to not make mistakes in drafting and that which is omitted is done so on
purpose. See supra note 69 (doctrine of expressio unius est exclusio alterius).
196
The law in Delaware states that “[u]nless specifically hired as a common law agent by a
written brokerage agreement, a licensee is a statutory agent . . . .” DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 24, §
2936(a) (West, current through 2013).
197
Minnesota Statutes, section 82 is not a default rule, it is compulsory. See generally MINN.
STAT. § 82 (2012).
198
Imputed knowledge is knowledge “attributed” to a person, particularly due to that person’s
legal responsibilities for another’s conduct, such as an agent. See BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 951
(9th ed. 2009). Delaware disclaims imputed knowledge. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 24, § 2936(f)
(West, current through 2013).
199
But see White v. Boucher, 322 N.W.2d 560,563 (Minn. 1982) (noting that the agent did not
disclose information to the principal and treated the non-disclosure as not being imputed to the
principal, yet the court did not reach the issue of imputation). However, in the context of seller
disclosure requirements, there is still imputation of knowledge. MINN. STAT. § 513.55, subdiv. 2
(2012).
200
See supra note 198 (and accompanying text).
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VI.
A.

THE ATTORNEY-BROKER: DUAL AGENCY JUST GOT COMPLICATED

Minnesota and the Attorney-Broker
Normally, the consumer thinks of a real estate broker as one who is licensed as a

real estate broker. However, that is not always the case. Most states, including Minnesota,
provide for a licensing exception for attorneys. “The right of an attorney to participate in real
estate transactions is predominately governed by state real state licensing statutes.”201 In the case
of Minnesota, that is Minnesota Statutes, section 82.56 (a).202 Minnesota permits the attorney to
act as a broker with the requirement that the funds be segregated in a trust account separate from
the law practice’s funds.203 No law absolutely prevents an attorney from engaging in a dual
agency in a real estate transaction in Minnesota. However, engaging in duplicative representation
implicates the Minnesota Rules of Professional Conduct (“MRPC”).
The problem with an attorney acting in a dual agency capacity is that, for
example, “[a]s a seller’s broker . . . the attorney would owe [a] duty to the buyer to disclose
known defects in a home sale, a disclosure quite inconsistent with [an] attorney’s duty to
preserve client confidences.”204 The MRPC recognizes that there are instances where conflicts
arise in the course of representation, but the rules cannot provide for every eventuality. When
more unusual conflicts come about, these “issues must be resolved through the exercise of
sensitive professional and moral judgment guided by the basic principles underlying the
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J.P. Sawyer, When does an Attorney need a Real Estate License?, 17 J. LEGAL PROF. 329, 331
(1992).
202
MINN. STAT. § 82.56 (a) (2012) (providing an exception to the licensing requirement for
licensed attorneys who comply with the trust account provisions of under MINN. STAT. § 82.75).
203
See id. §§ 82.56(a) & 82.75.
204
George Lefcoe, REAL ESTATE TRANSACTIONS, FINANCE, AND DEVELOPMENT, 38 (6th ed.
2009).
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rules.”205 When an attorney acts as a real estate broker, particularly when the attorney engages in
dual agency, a number of MRPC rules are potentially implicated.206 The lawyer may even be
subject to a claim of malpractice if the conflict is not cured and an injury was caused by the
conflict.207
The Lawyers Professional Responsibility Board issued an opinion regarding
malpractice and a concurrent conflict of interest.208 When a lawyer also acts as a broker it is clear
that the attorney broker assumes an interest in the transaction similar to that of a contingency fee.
In a contingency fee situation, the attorney acquires an interest in the outcome of a client’s case
and receives a percentage of any sum recovered.209 Similarly, when an attorney acts as a broker,
the attorney gains a commission in the form of a percentage. This correlation alone demonstrates
that the lawyer-broker should, at a minimum, follow the same procedures for establishing a
contingency fee as establishing a commission.210 The contingency fee provisions in the MRPC

MINN. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT PMBL. ¶ 9 (2005) (with amendments through July 1, 2011).
The MRPC rules that may be implicated likely include: rule 1.5 regarding fees; rule 1.6
regarding confidentiality of information; rule 1.7 and 1.8 regarding conflicts of interest; 1.9
regarding duties to former clients; and others that may arise under a particular set of facts.
207
See Gustafson v. Chestnut, 515 N.W.2d 114, 116 (Minn. Ct. App. 1994) (finding that, in a
realty transaction, the malpractice claim failed because the conflict of interest did not cause the
client’s harm).
208
Minn. Lawyers Prof’l Responsibility Bd., Formal Op. 21 (2009) (discussing a lawyer’s duty
to inform a client about the lawyer’s own malpractice), available at
http://lprb.mncourts.gov/rules/LPRBOpinions/Opinion%2021.pdf.
209
MINN. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.5(C) (2005).
210
See id. A contingent fee must be: 1) in writing; 2) signed by the client; 3) describing the
method the fee is determined; 4) clear about any expenses the client will have to pay. The
attorney also has to send an invoice to the client after the transaction describing the outcome of
the transaction, and describing any remittance to the client and the method if its determination.
Of course, the fee must be reasonable. Id.
205
206
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are geared towards civil actions and arguably don’t apply to a real estate transaction. 211 However,
the MRPC contemplated instances where MRPC does not appear explicit, yet the underlining
principles of the code should still govern.212 Even though the acts of a broker are not technically
the practice of law, when a lawyer performs those acts, at a minimum, the spirit of rule 1.5(c)
regarding contingency fees should compel the attorney take heed.
A question arises as to how the attorney-broker gets around the prohibition of
representing a client who is “directly adverse to another client,” as a buyer and seller are under
the dual agency context.213 As stated, there is no law in Minnesota that prohibits this kind of
representation, but there is the MRPC to consider. The MRPC contemplates litigation in an
adversarial context, not a transaction where there may actually be no adversarial nature to the
deal.214 Furthermore, if the lawyer is acting in a dual agency, the lawyer should create an “ethical
wall”215 between the lawyer’s law practice and the non-legal services provided as broker. This is
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An argument can be made that the rules of professional responsibility do not apply or are at a
minimum insufficient in regulating a transactional lawyer’s conduct. The Model Rules of
Professional Conduct, for example, “are premised on an adversarial system; they presume
adverse parties, zealous advocates, and a neutral tribunal. They were never designed to guide a
lawyer’s transactional work . . . which is often non-adversarial and cooperative.” Gregory M.
Duhl, The Ethics of Contract Drafting, 14 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 989, 995 (2010) (discussing,
inter alia, the ethics behind attorney contract drafting).
212
MINN. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT PMBL. ¶ 9 (2005).
213
Id. R. 1.7(a)(1).
214
See supra note 211.
215
The term “Chinese wall,” while common place, is potentially offensive and is substituted with
other terms, such as “ethical wall.” Christopher J. Dunnigan, The Art Formerly Known as the
Chinese Wall: Screening in Law Firms: Why, When, Where, and How, 11 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS
291, 291 n.1 (1998). An “ethical wall” is a set of procedures used to ensure that confidential
information does not pass between persons associated with the same firm. Id. at 291–92.
However, such walls are not perfect. “The most obvious problem with the implementation of a
screening system is that if two lawyers [or agents] within a firm are determined to share a
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done through MRPC’s rule 1.7(b). If the requirements of 1.7(b) are met, the attorney can act as a
dual agent in a real estate transaction. Patrick Burns, as First Assistant Director of the Minnesota
Office of Lawyers Professional Responsibility, while not a formal opinion, contemplated a
similar conflict arising from the sale of title insurance.216
Patrick Burns identifies the multi-layered conflict that arises when an attorney
sells title insurance to a client for a commission.217 He compares the lawyer’s financial interest
with the attorney acting as an agent for the title insurance company and the client.218 Patrick
Burns concludes that this multi-layered conflict, where an attorney’s financial interest intersects
a dual representative capacity, is consentable under rule 1.7(b).219 There are four requirements
under rule 1.7(b), yet only three apply because a real estate transaction is not done in front of a
tribunal nor does it involve a legal claim.220 In the context of a dual agency in which an attorney
acts as broker for a client, the attorney must “reasonably believe” that the lawyer can give
“competent and diligent representation to each affected client.”221 The lawyer needs to be sure
the representation is not prohibited by law, and finally, “each affected client gives informed

confidence that they should not, a screen will not stop them.” Id. at 298. In fact, when the firm
and the agents stand to gain from a higher commission and income, the risk will be ever present.
216
PATRICK R. BURNS, FIRST ASSISTANT DIR., AVOIDING CONFLICTS IN THE SALE OF TITLE
INSURANCE TO CLIENTS (2008), available at
http://lprb.mncourts.gov/articles/Articles/Avoiding%20Conflicts%20in%20the%20Sale%20of%
20Title%20Insurance%20to%20Clients.pdf.
217
Id.
218
Id.
219
Id.
220
See MINN. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.7(b)(3) (2005) (regarding client claims against
another client or proceedings before a tribunal).
221
Id. R. 1.7(b)(1).
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consent, confirmed in writing.”222 As long as the attorney can pass these three tests, the conflict
is consentable and the attorney can proceed with the dual representation.
Permitting an attorney to also act as a real estate broker presents an “ethical gap”
when trying to find where the attorney’s legal ethics do not extend to his real estate
transactions.223 Some states try to address the question by limiting the licensing exception to
attorneys who are acting within the scope of client representation.224 Minnesota deals with the
“ethical gap” through case law.225 In In re Scallen, the Minnesota Supreme Court noted that there
is a “heavy burden placed on attorney-business people” and the “Code of Professional
Responsibility” applies to them.226 It is no excuse to say that since the work of a broker is not the
practice of law, the code does not apply to the attorney acting as broker.227
B.

Pulse of the Nation: The Attorney-Broker
Whether or not an attorney can act as a broker is determined by state law. The

particular law that a state adopts is indicative of how risky the state sees an attorney acting as a
broker. Some states find it very risky and prohibit it outright,228 unless the lawyer also has a

222

Id. R. 1.7(b)(2) & (4). Informed consent should be acquired via independent counsel from
another attorney and the consent put in writing signed by each client. Id. R. 1.7(b)(4), cmt. 10,
18, 20. Even if the client initially give informed consent to the conflict, the client may revoke
that consent. Id. cmt. 21. Such a revocation is consistent with the common law principal of
continued control of the agent and should be extended to the basic broker-client relationship. See
also id. R. 1.0(f) (regarding informed consent requiring “adequate information and explanation
about the material risks of and reasonably available alternatives to the proposed course of
conduct.”).
223
Sawyer, supra note 201, at 334.
224
Id.
225
In re Scallen, 269 N.W.2d 834 (Minn. 1978).
226
Id. at 841–42.
227
See id.
228
States that prohibit a lawyer from acting as a real estate broker without being separately
licensed include:
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broker’s license. Other states permit a lawyer to act as a broker without a license,229 apparently
finding the risk to be lower or at least tolerable. Those states that permit a lawyer to also act as a

Hawaii. Prohibiting a licensed attorney from acting also as a real estate broker without
being separately licensed. See HAW. REV. STAT. §§ 467-2, 467-7 (2013) (requiring everyone to be
licensed except for a few exceptions—attorneys at law not listed as one of the exceptions). See
also Katayama v. Heller-White Hotels Co. Inc., 692 F.Supp. 1239, 1243 (D. Haw. 1988)
(applying Hawaii law and reversing summary judgment because there was an issue of fact as to
whether or not the attorney acted as a broker—while unlicensed as such, which would preclude
him from recovering a broker’s commission).
Texas. Prohibits an attorney at law from acting as a broker without a separate real estate
broker’s license. TEX. OCC. CODE ANN. § 1101.351 (West, current through the end of the 2013
Third Called Sess.); see also Sherman v. Burton, 497 S.W.2d 316, 321 (Tex. Civ. App. 1973)
(finding that an attorney is not authorized to engage generally in the business of a broker by
virtue of his license).
229
States that provide for a total exemption of the licensing requirement whether or not the
attorney is providing brokerage services ancillary to the legal services include:
Delaware. Providing for an exemption to the licensing requirement for attorneys at law.
DEL. CODE ANN. Tit. 24, § 2901(e)(3) (West, current through 2013).
Maryland. Exempting attorneys who: 1) do not regularly engage in real estate
transactions; and 2) do not hold themselves out as being engaged in a broker’s business. MD.
CODE ANN., BUS. OCC. & PROF. § 17-301(b) (West, current through the 2013 Reg. Sess.); see
also Atlantic Richfield Co. v. Sybert, 456 A.2d 20, 28 (Md. 1983) (interpreting, then statute MD.
CODE ANN., BUS. OCC. & PROF. art. 56 § 212(f) (6) (1957), effectively placing Maryland into the
total exemption camp since the attorney does not have to provide the brokerage service as
ancillary to the practice of law).
Minnesota. An attorney may act as a broker without a separate broker’s license so long
as the attorney complies with the statute’s trust account requirements. MINN. STAT. § 82.56(a)
(2012).
Missouri. Providing for an exemption from chapter 339’s licensing requirement for
attorneys at law. MO. ANN. STAT. § 339.010(7)(2) (West, current through the end of the 2013
First Reg. Sess.). The Missouri Supreme Court justified this exemption stating: “The exemption
of attorneys is rational because each attorney has been licensed professionally and is regulated by
this [c]ourt and, therefore, does not need to be governed by chapter 339.” Kan. City Premier
Apartments, Inc. v. Missouri Real Estate Comm’n, 344 S.W.3d 160, 171 (Mo. 2011) cert.
denied, 132 S. Ct. 1075, 181 L. Ed. 2d 739 (U.S. 2012).
New York. Providing an exception to the licensing requirement for attorneys at law.
N.Y. REAL PROP. LAW § 442-f (McKinney 2013). This exception has been a long standing one
recognized also by the courts in New York. See Weinblatt v. Parkway-St. Johns Corp., 241
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broker without a separate broker’s license can be divided into a total exemption camp or the
exemption with the caveat that the lawyer can act as broker only as an incidental service of the
practice of law. Most states fall into the exemption with the caveat that the lawyer can only act as
a broker when the brokerage services are incidental to the legal services provided to a client.230

N.Y.S. 721, 721 aff’d without op., 243 N.Y.S. 810 (N.Y. App. Div. 1930) (concluding that
passing the bar is a good enough licensing requirement to act as a broker). See also Matter of
Cianelli v. Dept. of State of N.Y., 16 A.D.2d 352, 353–54 (1962) (finding that where an attorney
received and then lost his broker’s license, he could still act as a broker due to his admittance to
the bar).
Rhode Island. Enumerating an exception to the licensing requirement for attorneys at
law. R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 5-20.5-2(b)(1) (West, current through the 2013 Reg. Sess.).
South Dakota. South Dakota exempts a licensed attorney, unless that licensed attorney
holds himself out and advertises himself as one who provides brokerage services. S.D. CODIFIED
LAWS § 36-21A-29(a)(7) (2013).
230
States that allow the attorney to act as a broker without a separate license when practicing law
or similar caveat include:
Alabama. Exempting attorneys at law when performing the attorney’s duties as such.
ALA. CODE § 34-27-2(b)(2) (2013).
Alaska. Exempting attorneys from the licensing requirement when performing duties as
an attorney. ALASKA STAT. ANN. § 08.88.900(a)(3) (West, current through 2013 1st Reg. Sess.).
Arizona. Exempting attorneys from the licensing requirement in performing the duties of
a lawyer and expressly denying attorneys the ability to act as a broker in other capacities outside
the practice of law without a separate license. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 32-2121(A)(3) (2013)
(current through the First Regular and First Special Sessions of the Fifty-first Legislature).
Arkansas. Exempts attorneys in the practice of law. ARK. CODE ANN. § 17-42-104(a)(3)
(West, current through the end of the 2013 Reg. Sess.).
California. Exempting attorneys from a licensing requirement when rendering legal
services to a client and such services include real estate broker services. CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE
§ 10133(a)(3) (West, current through the 2013 Reg. Sess.).
Colorado. Stating that the term “real estate broker” does not apply to an attorney at law
who is practicing law on behalf of a client. COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12-61-101(2)(b)(V) (West,
current through the First Reg. Sess. (2013)) (exempting, presumably, attorneys who are
practicing law on behalf of a client from the licensing requirement that a real estate broker would
be subject to).
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Connecticut. Exempting attorneys at law in the “performance” of the attorney’s duties as
such. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 20-329(a)(2) (West, current with Pub. Acts of the 2013 Jan. Reg.
Sess.).
Florida. Providing an exception for attorneys at law when acting within the scope of an
attorney’s duties. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 475.011(1) (West, current through the 2013 1st Reg. Sess.).
Georgia. Exempting attorneys when “acting solely as an incident to the practice of law . .
. .” GA. CODE ANN. § 43-40-29(a)(3) (West, current through the end of the 2013 Reg. Sess.).
Idaho. Exempts attorneys from the licensure requirement insomuch as the attorney is
furthering the representation of the particular client and does not regularly engage in realty
transactions. IDAHO CODE ANN. § 54-2003(1)(e) (West, current through 2013).
Illinois. Exempting attorneys at law in performing duties as such. 225 ILL. COMP. STAT.
ANN. 454/5-20(2) (West, current through the 2013 Reg. Sess.).
Indiana. Exempting attorneys in the practice of law. IND. CODE ANN. § 25-34.1-3-2(b)(1)
(West, current through 2013).
Iowa. Exempts attorneys when “acting solely as an incident to the practice of law.” IOWA
CODE § 543B.7(3) (2013).
Kansas. Exempts attorneys when performing “professional duties as an attorney.” KAN.
STAT. ANN. § 58-3037(C) (West, current through 2013).
Kentucky. Exempts attorneys in “performing his duties as attorney-at-law.” KY. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 324.030(3) (West, current through the end of the 2013 Reg. Sess.).
Louisiana. Exempts attorneys at law who, in the regular course of client representation,
engage in the work of a real estate broker. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 1438(A)(2) (2012).
Maine. Provides an exception for attorneys at law from the definition of a real estate
brokerage when the attorney performs duties related to practice of law and does not regularly
engage in real estate brokerages. ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 32, § 13002(2) (2013).
Massachusetts. Exempts attorneys who are rendering a service to a client and the
transaction is in furtherance of that representation. MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 112, § 87QQ (2013).
Michigan. Exempts attorneys at law acting as such. MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. §
339.2503(2) (West, current through 2013). In Michigan, an attorney cannot collect a
commission, even acting solely as a finder without a license—unless the attorney was acting on
behalf of a client. Kraus v. Boraks, 67 N.W.2d 202, 204–05 (Mich. 1954).
Mississippi. Exempts licensed attorneys who are performing “primary or incidental” acts
related to the practice of law. MISS. CODE ANN. § 73-35-3(8)(a) (West, current through the end of
the 2013 Reg. Sess.).
Montana. Providing an exception for attorneys at law while “performing” the attorney’s
“duties.” MONT. CODE ANN. § 37-51-103(1)(c) (2013).
Nebraska. Exempts attorneys at law when performing their duties as such. NEB. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 81-885.04(2) (West, current through the Second Reg. Sess. (2012)).
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Nevada. Exempts attorneys at law performing their duties as such. NEV. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 645.240(2)(C) (West, current through the 2011 Reg. Sess.).
New Hampshire. Exempts attorneys at law in performing their duties as such. N.H. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 331-A:4(a)(III) (2013).
New Jersey. While the New Jersey statute gives a total exemption for attorneys at law,
courts have limited the exemption to attorneys who act as a broker ancillary to the practice of
law for the particular client. Compare N.J. STAT. ANN. § 45:15-4 (2013) (observing that the
exemption is limited to attorneys acting within their scope as attorneys for the client), with
Spirito v. N.J. Real Estate Comm’n, 434 A.2d 623 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1981), and Matter
of Roth, 577 A.2d 490 (1990) (reaching the same conclusion).
New Mexico. Exempts attorneys at law in performing their duties as such. N.M. STAT.
ANN. § 61-29-2(C)(5) (West, current through the First Reg. Sess. (2013)).
North Carolina. Exempts “active” state bar members when their actions constitute the
“practice of law.” N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 93A-2(c)(3) (West, current through the 2013 Reg.
Sess.).
North Dakota. Exempts attorneys at law from licensure requirements when the attorney
handles the transaction in the “usual course of the practice of law.” N.D. CENT. CODE ANN. § 4323-07(a)(2) (West, current through the 2013 Reg. Sess.).
Ohio. Provides an exception for licensed attorneys in the performance of the lawyer’s
duties. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 4735.01(I)(1)(d) (West, current through 2013).
Oklahoma. Exempts attorneys at law in performing their duties as such. OKLA. STAT.
ANN. tit. 59, § 858-301(a)(3) (West, current through the First Reg. Sess. (2013)).
Oregon. Exempts attorneys at law in performing their duties as such. OR. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 696.030(4) (West, current through the 2013 Reg. Sess.).
Pennsylvania. 63 PA. STAT. ANN. § 455.304(4) (West, current through the 2013 Reg.
Sess.), as interpreted in Kribbs v. Jackson, 129 A.2d 490, 495 (Pa. 1957) (interpreting the law to
mean that an attorney is exempt from the licensing requirement “as an incident of his legal
profession.”).
South Carolina. Exempts attorneys acting within the scope of representation of a client.
S.C. CODE ANN. § 40-57-240(a)(2) (2012).
Tennessee. Exempts attorneys in the performance of their duties as such. TENN. CODE
ANN. § 62-13-104(a)(1)(C) (West, current through the end of the 2013 First Reg. Sess.).
Utah. Exempts attorneys in the performance of their duties as such. UTAH CODE ANN. §
61-2f-202(2)(b) (West, current through the 2013 First Special Sess.).
Vermont. Exempts attorneys at law from licensure requirements when the attorney
handles the transaction in the “usual course of the practice of law.” VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 26, §
2211(b)(2) (West, current through the First Sess. (2013–14)).
Virginia. Exempts attorneys at law in the performance of their duties as such. VA. CODE
ANN. § 54.1-2103(A)(3) (West, current through the end of the 2013 Reg. Sess.).
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The American Bar Association (“ABA”) has weighed in cautioning practitioners
to avoid altogether the attorney-broker conflict.231 The ABA favors the “ancillary business rule,”
which has been adopted in one form or another by most states.232 Minnesota has not adopted the
suggestion, instead falling into the total exemption camp.233 Evidently, Minnesota has thus far
relied on MRPC rule 1.7 and other applicable rules to govern lawyers when their personal
interests are in conflict with their clients or when they represent conflict-prone clients.234
Under a designated agency situation where an attorney acts as broker designating
employee-lawyers to represent a buyer or seller exclusively, the attorney should follow the spirit
of the “screening off” rule. The Model Rules of Professional Conduct affirms that if a lawyer is
disqualified from representing a client that disqualification is imputed to the firm where the
lawyer works, unless an exception applies.235 This is to prevent harmful or other confidential

Washington. Exempts attorneys when practicing law. WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §
18.85.151(a)(3) (West, current through 2013).
West Virginia. Exempts lawyers who are providing “an ancillary service in conjunction
with a real estate transaction.” W.VA. CODE ANN. § 30-40-5(b) (West, current through the 2013
First Extraordinary Sess.).
Wisconsin. Exempts attorneys at law from the definition of a real estate broker while
acting within “the scope of their attorney’s license.” WIS. STAT. ANN. § 452.01(3)(h) (West,
current through 2013).
Wyoming. Exempts attorneys at law in the performance of their duties as such. WYO.
STAT. ANN. § 33-28-103(a)(ii) (West, current through the 2013 Gen. Sess.).
231
PATRICK A. RANDOLPH, THINKING OF BEING A LAWYER/BROKER? THINK AGAIN. (Oct. 12,
2013, 1:25 PM), http://dirt.umkc.edu/files/art2.htm.
232
Id.; see supra note 230 (and accompanying text).
233
See supra note 228.
234
See MINN. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.7 cmt. 10 (2005) (cautioning that a “lawyer’s own
interests should not be permitted to have an adverse effect on representation of a client.”).
235
MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.18(c) & (d) (2003).
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information from being used against the client.236 When a law firm acts as a brokerage and
engages in a designated agency type237 of realty transaction, similar safeguards used to screen off
conflicted-out attorneys in litigation should be used to screen employee attorneys that
exclusively represent a buyer or seller to prevent confidential information from being shared inhouse. Minnesota Statutes, section 82 currently does not provide for that safeguard. The result
being, as long as the parties consent and MRPC rule 1.7(b) is followed, information could be
shared that isn’t about price, terms, or motivation for the transaction.
VII.

PROPOSED STATUTORY AMENDMENTS TO MINNESOTA STATUTES SECTION 82: ALIGNING
TEXT AND PURPOSE

A.

Amendment to Minnesota Statutes, Section 82.55, Subdivision 6: Definition Bifurcation

and Material Fact
In Part VII, various provisions of section 82 are redrafted with example
amendments. The examples throughout Part VII follow the basic statutory amendment form in
that underlined language is added language and stricken language is deleted language and normal
text is unaltered. Minnesota Statutes, section 82.55 subdivision 6 should be bifurcated into a dual
agency and designated agency definition as follows:


Dual Agency. “Dual Agency” means a situation in which a licensee or person exempted
from the licensure requirement represents both the buyer and the seller in the same real
estate transaction.

Id. cmt. 6 (stating that lawyers cannot use information from a prospective client that “could be
significantly harmful if used in the matter”).
237
Regardless of the term used to describe the transaction. In Minnesota, designated agency is
impermissible. See MINN. STAT. § 82.55, subdiv. 6 (2012). However, the client hires the law firm
in this case, and the firm may designate employee-attorneys in the firm to perform required
tasks. This is basic agency law.
236
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Designated Agency. “Designated Agency” means a situation in which at least two
salespersons, licensed to the same broker, each represent a party to the transaction to the
exclusion of all other parties.



Ordinary Purchaser. “Ordinary Purchaser” means the person or entity who presents
themselves as a prospective purchaser of residential realty and similarly situated parties,
which include: 1) natural persons; 2) entities; 3) trustees; and 4) agents thereof.

Adopting a bifurcated definition would make clear that a broker, salesperson, or professional
exempted from the licensure requirement can act as a dual agent. This is not a change to current
law but makes it clearer. It also means that only salespersons licensed to a licensed broker can
engage in a designated agency, to the exclusion of all others. Doing so, fixes the current statute’s
misuse of the word “licensee.”238 Finally, it would be helpful if the word “agent” was included
under section 82.55, subdivision 4 in addition to “closing agent” and “real estate closing agent”
since normally the generic word “agent” usually suffices.
Defining an ordinary purchaser is also useful because the statute, as written, does
not limit itself to the present purchaser.239 The ordinary purchaser at large is an ambiguous term.
It does not present boundaries of time and space. It could mean any ordinary purchaser anywhere
at any time. This is just too expansive an interpretation and is likely not what the Legislature
intended. Limiting the term to those persons and entities which are present and considering the
property fits with reality. As written, the agent may have a duty to disclose material facts that
some far-flung hypothetical ordinary purchaser may want to know at some point in the future,
particularly as modified by the preceding word “could.”240 It just doesn’t make sense and the
prospective purchaser doesn’t typically need or want that kind of disclosure. The definition

238

See id. § 82.55, subdiv. 6(1)–(2).
See id. § 82.68, subdiv. 3(a).
240
See id.
239
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includes consideration of the actual purchaser and similarly situated parties so that; for example,
a natural person, as the prospective purchaser, is considered among natural persons in the area
and the general interests that natural persons share in purchasing realty. On the other hand, when
an entity, such as a business in the business of flipping houses is the prospective purchaser, the
agent considers that entity among other entities that also flip houses and that industry’s general
interests, which may be significantly different from a natural person who wants to establish a
homestead. When thinking about an ordinary purchaser, it makes most sense to compare apples
with apples and oranges with oranges.
B.

Amendment to Minnesota Statutes, Section 82.66: A Clear Contract
Minnesota Statutes, section 82.66, subdivisions 1(9) and 2(7) should also be

amended. The example below uses the listing agreement language, which is similar to a buyer’s
agreement:


If a buyer represented by broker, salesperson, or professional exempted from licensure
(collectively termed “agent”) wishes to buy the seller's property, a dual agency will be
created. This means that broker the agent(s) will represent both the seller(s) and the
buyer(s), and owe the same duties to the buyer(s) that broker the agent(s) owes to the
seller(s). This conflict of interest will prohibit broker the agent(s) from advocating
exclusively on the seller's behalf. Dual agency will limit the level of representation
broker the agent(s) can provide. If a dual agency should arise, the seller(s) will need to
agree that confidential information about price, terms, and motivation will still be kept
confidential unless the seller(s) instruct broker the agent(s) in writing to disclose specific
information about the seller(s). All other information will be shared with the other party.
Broker The agent(s) cannot act as a dual agent(s) unless both the seller(s) and the
buyer(s) agree to it. By agreeing to a possible dual agency, the seller(s) will be giving up
the right to exclusive representation in an in-house transaction. However, if the seller(s)
should decide not to agree to a possible dual agency, and the seller(s) want broker to
represent the seller(s), the seller(s) may give up the opportunity to sell the property to
buyers represented by broker. At any time before closing, buyer(s) or seller(s) may
revoke consent to a dual agency relationship with the agent(s) in writing. This means that
the buyer(s) or seller(s) may elect either a designated agency relationship or a single
agency relationship with the agent(s). Neither buyer(s) nor seller(s) shall be liable to
agent(s) for any commission lost resulting from the change in the form of agency.
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Adopting these or similar changes will better inform the consumer about the dual agency
relationship and the consumer’s common law right and power to alter the form of the agency
relationship. It is also consistent with the common law stance as to losses when modifying the
form of the agency.241 Additionally, if a designated agency definition is to be adopted, it stands
to reason that a separate disclosure should be included in the contract, such as:


241

If a licensed broker designates one or more salespersons to represent the buyer(s) and one
or more salespersons to represent the seller(s), a designated agency will be created. This
means that buyer(s)’ salesperson(s) shall represent the buyer(s) exclusively and advance
buyer(s) interests and that seller(s)’ salesperson(s) shall represent the seller(s) exclusively
and advance the seller(s) interests. Since the salesperson(s) on both sides of the
transaction are affiliated with the same licensed broker, a financial conflict of interest
exists. In light of this conflict, all confidential information shall be kept confidential. No
information shall be shared between the salesperson(s) except information necessary to
facilitate the mechanics of the sale or confidential information the seller(s) permits the
salesperson(s) to disclose in writing. No other information will be shared, and the
licensed broker shall create safeguards and procedures to reasonably ensure that seller(s)
confidential information remains segregated from buyer(s) salesperson. If confidential
information is obtained about the other party to the transaction, the salesperson
representing the adversely affected party may not use that information whatsoever, unless
permitted by the adversely affected party in writing.
By agreeing to a possible designated agency, the seller(s) will not be giving up the
right to exclusive representation in an in-house transaction, but understands the broker
stands to gain the double commission if the sale occurs. Salesperson(s) cannot act as
designated agents unless both the seller(s) and buyer(s) agree to it. At any time before
closing, buyer(s) or seller(s) may revoke consent to a designated agency relationship with
the salesperson(s) in writing. The buyer(s) or seller(s) may elect to enter into a single
agency with licensed broker or salesperson. This means that the seller(s) may give up the
opportunity to sell the property to buyer(s) represented by the licensed broker. Instead,
the broker will engage other brokerages to find buyer(s). Seller(s) shall not be liable to
agent(s) for any commission lost resulting from the change in the form of agency.

See supra Part IV.B.
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Adopting this type of disclosure will inform the consumer in the same manner as the amended
dual agency disclosure. It also makes clear that if the seller does not wish to continue a
designated agency, before closing, the seller might give up the opportunity to find buyers
represented by the brokerage. Only in a designated agency should this result. The current statute
provides a vague qualifier “may” when it says the seller “may give up the opportunity to sell the
property to buyers represented by broker.”242 Separating the disclosures makes clearer what the
agency relationship is, and what the consumer’s rights and powers are in controlling that
relationship.
C.

Amendment to Minnesota Statutes, Section 82.67: Certainty as to Form
The changes to Minnesota Statutes, section 82. 67 are at least three fold: 1) there

needs to be certainty in the form, not substantial compliance; 2) the dual agency disclosure needs
to be bifurcated; and 3) subdivision 4 needs to include language regarding the consumer’s right
and power to control the form of agency. Subdivision 4 is in regards to the agency disclosure
required in the purchase agreement and a particular amendment there is omitted, yet should be
included in a manner consistent with the proposed amendments for the listing agreement and
subdivision 3 below.
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Subdivision 1. Agency disclosure. A real estate broker, or salesperson, or professional
exempt from licensure shall provide to a consumer in the sale and purchase of a
residential real property transaction at the first substantive contact with the consumer an
agency disclosure form in substantially the form set forth in subdivision 3. The agency
disclosure form shall be intended to provide a description of available options for agency
and facilitator relationships, and a description of the role of a licensee the agent(s) under
each option., and any right or power the consumer has to modify the form of the agency
relationship. The agency disclosure form shall provide a signature line for
acknowledgment of receipt by the consumer. The disclosures required by this subdivision
apply only to residential real property transactions.

§ 82.66, subdiv. 1(9).
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Adopting this language or something similar will require the agent to actually use the language
in the statutory disclosure form.243 Granted, most will do that anyway because it is easier to copy
and paste, but if the purpose of the section 82 is to protect the consumer,244 and it is, then the
language should be certain and fixed. Removing the word “substantially” does just that.


Subdivision 3. Agency disclosure form. The agency disclosure form shall be in
substantially the form set forth below:
Dual Agency-Broker Agent Representing both Seller and Buyer: Dual agency occurs
when one broker or salesperson agent represents both parties to a transaction,. or when
two salespersons licensed to the same broker each represent a party to the transaction.
Dual agency requires the informed consent of all parties, and means that the broker and
salesperson agent owe the same duties to the Sseller(s) and the Bbuyer(s). This role limits
the level of representation the broker and salespersons agent can provide, and prohibits
them the agent from acting exclusively for either party. In a dual agency, confidential
information about price, terms, and motivation for pursuing a transaction will be kept
confidential unless one party instructs the broker or salesperson the agent in writing to
disclose specific information about him or her. Other information will be shared with the
other party. Dual agents may not advocate for one party to the detriment of the other.
Within the limitations described above, dual agents owe to both Sseller(s) and Bbuyer(s)
the fiduciary duties described below. Dual agents must disclose to Bbuyer(s) material
facts as defined in Minnesota Statutes, section 82.68, subdivision 3, of which the broker
agent is aware that could adversely and significantly affect the Bbuyer’(s) use or
enjoyment of the property. At any time before closing, buyer(s) or seller(s) may revoke
consent to a dual agency relationship with the agent in writing. This means that the
buyer(s) or seller(s) may elect either a designated agency relationship or a single agency
relationship with the agent. Neither buyer(s) nor seller(s) shall be liable to the agent for
any commission lost resulting from the change in the form of agency.
Designated Agency-Salesperson Designated to Represent Either Seller(s) or Buyer(s)
In-House. Designated agency occurs when a licensed broker designates one or more
salespersons to represent the buyer(s) and one or more salespersons to represent the
seller(s). Designated agency requires informed consent of all parties, and means that the
assigned salesperson shall represent the consumer exclusively and advance that
consumer’s interests. No information shall be shared between the salesperson(s) except
information necessary to facilitate the mechanics of the sale or confidential information
the parties permit the salesperson(s) to disclose in writing. No other information will be

See id. § 82.67, subdiv. 3. (currently only requiring the “form be in substantially the form set”
in subdivision 3).
244
See supra Part IV.A.
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shared, and the licensed broker shall create safeguards and procedures to reasonably
ensure that a party’s confidential information remains segregated from the other party’s
salesperson. If confidential information is obtained about the other party to the
transaction, the salesperson representing the adversely affected party may not use that
information whatsoever, unless permitted by the adversely affected party in writing.
By agreeing to a possible designated agency, the seller(s) will not be giving up the
right to exclusive representation in an in-house transaction, but understands the broker
stands to gain the double commission if the sale occurs. At any time before closing,
buyer(s) or seller(s) may revoke consent to a designated agency relationship with the
salesperson(s) in writing. The buyer(s) or seller(s) may elect to enter into a single agency
with licensed broker or salesperson. This means that the revoking seller(s) may give up
the opportunity to sell the property to buyer(s) represented by the licensed broker and the
revoking buyer(s) may give up the opportunity to purchase from sellers represented by
the licensed broker. Instead, the broker will engage other brokerages to find buyer(s) or
seller(s). Neither buyer(s) nor seller(s) shall be liable to agent(s) for any commission lost
resulting from the change in the form of agency.
Adopting these changes, or similar changes, increases consistency across the three required
agency disclosures in a residential real estate transaction. It also informs the consumer as to their
rights and powers in controlling the agency relationship. The disclosure also makes clearer the
conflict of interest and the brokerage’s financial interest in receiving a double commission,
whether under dual or designated agency.
D.

Amendment to Minnesota Statutes, Section 82.68: The Principal Is Always Right
Minnesota Statutes, section 82.68, subdivision 3 regarding material facts should

be amended as follows:


Material facts. (a) A licensee An agent shall disclose to a prospective purchaser all
material facts of which the licensee agent is aware, which could adversely and
significantly affect an ordinary purchaser's use or enjoyment of the property, or any
intended use of the property of which the licensee agent is aware.
(b) It is not a material fact relating to real property offered for sale the fact or suspicion
that the property:
(1) is or was occupied by an owner or occupant who is or was suspected to be
infected with human immunodeficiency virus or diagnosed with acquired
immunodeficiency syndrome;
(2) was the site of a suicide, accidental death, natural death, or perceived
paranormal activity; or
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(3) is located in a neighborhood containing any adult family home, communitybased residential facility, or nursing home.
(4) Notwithstanding the provisions contained in subsection (b)(1)–(3), an agent
shall disclose as a material fact information contained in subsection (b)(1)–(3), of which
the agent is aware, that may adversely affect the value of the property to the ordinary
purchaser or information requested by the purchaser regarding the subjects covered in
(b)(1)–(3).
(c) A licensee or employee of the licensee An agent has no duty to disclose information
regarding an offender who is required to register under section 243.166, or about whom
notification is made under that section, if the broker or salesperson agent, in a timely
manner, provides a written notice that information about the predatory offender registry
and persons registered with the registry may be obtained by contacting local law
enforcement where the property is located or the Department of Corrections, or unless the
purchaser requests the agent to provide the information in writing.
(d) A licensee or employee of the licensee An agent has no duty to disclose information
regarding airport zoning regulations if the broker or salesperson agent, in a timely
manner, provides a written notice that a copy of the airport zoning regulations as adopted
can be reviewed or obtained at the office of the county recorder where the zoned area is
located, or unless the purchaser requests the agent to provide the information in writing.
(e) A licensee An agent is not required to disclose, except as otherwise provided in
paragraph (f), information relating to the physical condition of the property or any other
information relating to the real estate transaction, if a written report that discloses the
information has been prepared by a qualified third party and provided to the person
purchaser. For the purposes of this paragraph, "qualified third party" means a federal,
state, or local governmental agency, or any person whom the broker, salesperson, or a
party to the real estate transaction reasonably believes has the expertise necessary to meet
the industry standards of practice for the type of inspection or investigation that has been
conducted by the third party in order to prepare the written report and who is acceptable
to the person to whom the disclosure is being made.
(f) A licensee An agent shall disclose to the parties to a real estate transaction any facts
known by the broker or salesperson agent that contradict any information included in a
written report described in paragraph (e), if a copy of the report is provided to the
licensee agent.
(g) The limitation on disclosures in paragraphs (b) and (c) shall modify any common law
duties with respect to disclosure of material facts, unless the purchaser requests the
information from the agent in writing.
This amendment is appropriate because it lets the principal determine what is best for the
principal. The amendment also changes, where needed, the word “licensee” or “broker and/or
salesperson” to “agent” so as to include the concept of an attorney broker who is not licensed—
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the attorney broker being omitted from the definition of a “licensee.”245 However, this
amendment would be most effective if the terms “ordinary purchaser,” and “agent” were defined
as proposed above.246
E.

The Attorney-Broker Exception Bridled
Minnesota Statutes, section 82.56(a) should be amended as follows:


(a) a licensed practicing attorney if the attorney complies in all respects with the trust
account provisions of this chapter and provides broker services ancillary to the practice of
law for a particular client.

Amending the statute in this or a similar manner will ensure that an attorney can only provide
broker services only in the furtherance of a particular client’s overall representation. This is
desirable because, as the ABA noted, the ethical responsibilities of a broker and a lawyer are
different and treating attorneys the same as a broker doesn’t make much sense.247 When
Minnesota totally exempts an attorney from the licensure requirement, Minnesota treats an
attorney’s license as equal to or even greater than a broker’s license for realty transactional
purposes. All without ensuring that the attorney knows anything about realty transactions, which
is against the purpose of section 82 in protecting the consumer from incompetent licensees.248
F.

Amendments Uniquely Tailored to Protect the Consumer

See MINN. STAT. § 82.55, subdiv. 10 (2012). (defining a “licensee” as one who is licensed
under the chapter, yet attorneys are exempt from the licensure requirement under section
82.56(a)).
246
See supra Part VII.A.
247
See supra note 231.
248
While this might be justifiable due to the competence requirement in MRPC rule 1.1, it is not
desirable when the purpose of section 82 is to protect the consumer. See supra Part IV.A.
245
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As mentioned above, statutes in Delaware and Texas help give the consumer the
choice to opt out of the statutory agency relationship and also have designated a committee to
draft disclosure forms with a special purpose to protect the consumer.249 Such an approach could
be useful in Minnesota as a means to further the overall purpose of section 82 in protecting the
consumer. Minnesota could adopt this approach as follows:


In Minnesota Statutes, section 82.66, the section that requires the statutory agency
agreement to be in writing, Language could be included in the beginning of subdivisions
1 and 2 that states: Unless the consumer enters into an agency relationship contract under
the common law principles of agency, [remainder of the subdivision omitted].

Amending the statute in this manner will give the consumer the choice to require an agent to
provide a more robust form of disclosure in compliance with the common law as discussed in
Parts II and III of this article. The Minnesota Legislature should also include an amendment,
similar to Texas, to form a committee of brokers and attorneys with the task of creating better
disclosure forms that properly inform the consumer. The Texas statute is well written and should
be incorporated into Minnesota Statutes, section 82 as currently written:


(a) “[T]he committee shall draft and revise contract forms that are capable of being
standardized to expedite real estate transactions and minimize controversy. (b) The
contract forms must contain safeguards adequate to protect the principals in the
transaction.”250
VIII.

SUMMATION
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See supra Part V.
TEX. OCC. CODE ANN. § 1101.254(a)–(b) (West, current through the end of the 2013 Third
Called Sess.). See also James N. Johnson, Texas Real Estate Broker-Lawyer Committee, in
1TEX. PRACTICE GUIDE: REAL ESTATE TRANSACTIONS § 4:3 (2012) (discussing the committee
generally).
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As examined throughout this article, Minnesota Statutes, section 82 is
problematic. It fails to adequately uphold its purpose of protecting the consumer in a residential
realty transaction by materially limiting the disclosures required to form the agency relationship
that brings the protected transaction about.251 An amendment to the statute is necessary to ensure
the purpose is better served and rectify some of the ambiguity in the text itself. As the statute
currently stands, the brokerage’s double commission is safeguarded at the expense of the
informed consumer. Purchasing a homestead truly is one of the most significant purchases the
consumer will ever engage in, and as the Minnesota Supreme Court put it: “[w]hat might be ‘the
best thing’ for the [principal] must ultimately be the [principal’s] decision, not the agent’s.”252
Providing a more robust disclosure requirement, and the amendments above, aids in the overall
purpose of section 82 so that the consumer can truly decide was is best.
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See supra Parts III & IV.
White v. Boucher, 322 N.W.2d 560, 555–56 (Minn. 1982).
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